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GETTING PAST DEMOCRACY
EDWARD L. RUBIN'
INTRODUCTION
The tension between our concept of democracy and the govern-
ment we actually possess is well known, despite our insistent efforts to
claim that the term "democracy" accurately describes our governmen-
tal system. One area where this tension has been apparent is Ameri-
can constitutionalism. The conflict between our concept of democ-
racy and the institution of judicial review became a political issue
when the Supreme Court placed itself in opposition to Progressive Era
and New Deal legislation. This same conflict subsequently served as a
central concern of the Legal Process School, which indelibly charac-
terized it as the "counter-majoritarian difficulty."'
The more far-reaching and intractable source of tension, however,
involves the existence of the administrative state. At least since the
witings of John Stuart Mill,2 political and legal thinkers have been
acutely aware that the existence of a massive, appointed, and creden-
tialed bureaucracy that carries out the great bulk of the government's
activities represents a challenge to our characterization of that gov-
ernment as a democracy." In contemporary constitutional and admin-
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ALEXLNDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962); see id. at 19
("[Nlothing can finally depreciate the central function that is assigned in democratic
theory and practice to the electoral process .... Judicial review works counter to this
characteristic."); sr also JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS 10 (1980) ("[Tlhe procedure ofjudicial review is in conflict with
the fundamental principle of democracy-majority rule under conditions of political
freedom."); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRAc( AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REviEw 4-5 (1980) ("[T]he central [problem of] judicial review [is that] a body that is
not elected or othenise politically responsible in any significant way is telling the peo-
ple's elected representatives that they cannot govern as they'd like.").
SuJOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 120
(New York, Henry Holt & Co. 1882) (considering bureaucracy as one of the infirmities
to which representative government is liable).
Sr, e.g., ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES 185-201 (Eden Paul & Cedar Paul
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istrative law scholarship, the bureaucracy has been viewed as a viola-
tion of the three branch system specified in the Constitution,' an in-
terference with the unitary nature of the presidency, 5 and, more gen-
erally, an abandonment of our democratically based commitments to
popular sovereignty and public accountability."
Recently, however, legal scholars and political scientists have be-
gun to reassess this issue and to question whether the conflict between
trans., Dover Publ'ns, Inc. 1959) (1915) (studying the centralizing and decentralizing
tendencies of bureaucracy); GAETANO MOSCA, THE RULING CLASS 70 (Arthur Living-
ston ed. & Hannah D. Kahn trans., 1939) (arguing that bureaucratic absolutism makes
a mockery of representative democracy); Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM
MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 77-90 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., Gal-
axy Books 1958) (1946) (exploring the rise of the administrative officialdom and its
power within the modem state). But see JA.iES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
47-55 (Greenwood Press 1974) (1938) (portraying a more optimistic discussion of the
same phenomenon).
4 Specifically, congressionally created independent regulatory commissions haxe
been condemned as a "headless fourth branch." THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN.
MGMT., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT
IN THE FEDERAL GOvERNMENT 40 (1937) [hereinafter BROWNLOW REPORT]; seeJOHN
ROHR, To RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRA5TE STATE 135-
53 (1986) (discussing the Brownlow Report's call for eliminating multimember admin-
istrative boards in favor of agencies that could more efficiently transmit executive di-
rectives); see also Geoffrey Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV%. 41, 44 (argu-
ing that independent regulatory agencies violate the Constitution).
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995) (considering the impact of independent agencies on the
strength of the executive); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994) (positing that the notion of a unitary
executive has its basis in the Constitution); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, PluralJudiciary, 105 HARV. L. RE-%. 1155 (1992)
(examining the relevance of congressional power in restricting federal court jurisdic-
tion to the debate over the unitary executive); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1994) (contending that the no-
tion of a unitary executive, with strong powers over administrative officials, is not truly
compelled by what the Framers constitutionalized).
See, e.g., FRIEDRICH HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 134-35 (1979) (con-
sidering the politicization of bureaucracy); HENRYJACOBY, THE BUREAUCRATIZATION
OF THE WORLD 61 (Eveline L. Kanes trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1973) (1969) (analyzing
bureaucracy's "invasion" of government); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT
RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 9 (1993)
(expressing the belief that delegation of the power to make law yields inefficient regu-
lation and enables legislators and presidents to avoid accountability); MARTIN
SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDLANS? 55 (1988) (reviewing the relationship be-
tween administrative agencies and the courts that review them); Peter H. Aranson et
al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982) (arguing for a re-
newed nondelegation doctrine, under which the legislature would lose its ability to
shift responsibility through delegation); Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism, in
FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 166, 169 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1994) (stating
that "modem law has become a series of instructions to administrators rather than a
series of commands to citizens").
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democracy and the administrative state is as pervasive or profound as
traditionally claimed . By carefully assessing the meaning of the term
"democracy," they have concluded that this term does not necessarily
carry such strong anti-administrative implications; by carefully assess-
ing the operation of governmental agencies, they have observed that
the agencies do not necessarily violate the policies that underlie the
scholars' revised understanding of democratic theory. These scholars
have often reached their conclusions through a technique that can be
called microanalysis-the effort to describe human activities on an
operational level, to trace the way that individuals actually interact
without relying on overly conceptual generalizations about either so-
ciety or individual behavior.
This Article is an effort to carry the recent insights about the ad-
ministrative state's relationship to the concept of democracy one step
further, using this same microanalytic technique. It argues that the
7.', u ., THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, THE ALTERNATIVE PATH: A CLEANER, CHEAPER
WA TO PROTECT AND ENHA.NCE THE ENVIRONMENT 4 (1996) (arguing that better envi-
ronmental management will require a new and strengthened role of the regulator);
IV% AIRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULTION DEBATE 158-62 (1992) (advocating getting beyond the intellectual
stalemate between those who favor deregulation and those who favor strong state regu-
lation of businesses); BRLN J. COOK, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND REGULATORY
REFORM 19-34 (1988) (studying, with a focus on the EPA, the debates over proposed
alternative forms of regulation); JERRY L. MASHLW, GREED, CLAOS, AND GOVERNANCE:
USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 131 (1997) (considering whether ad-
ministrators should make political decisions); Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the
Administrative Stat: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759
(1997) (seeking to demolish the conception ofjudicial review as countermajoritarian);
Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987 (1997) (arguing that scholars should come to terms with
modern democracy and abandon efforts to reconcile the regulatory enterprises with
the will of the people);Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,
45 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1997) (proposing a model of collaborative government as an al-
ternatix c to interest representation in regulatory agencies); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating
lgalations: A Curejr Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982) (suggesting that negotiating pro-
posed regulations should replace formalized rulemaking procedures in developing
federal regulations);Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: 11ty Administrators Should Make Po-
litn al D,,risionw, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985) (citing weaknesses in the arguments of
noindelegation critics and proposing arguments in favor of delegation that are based
on political organization theory); Robert Reich, Public Administration and Public Delibera-
tim: An Intoprtetie Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617 (1985) (critiquing the emphasis on the
administratixe process and focusing, instead, on what the administrator does); Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Pnog-essive Law and Economics-And the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE
LJ. 341, 347 (1988) (urging the development of a "reformist law and economics" that
redirects the stud) of administrative law); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Just fica-
tioun or the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1992) (arguing that the theory of
civic republicanism provides the best justification for the American bureaucracy).
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term "democracy" irretrievably incorporates premodern conceptions
of government that do not reflect our genuine political commitments.
It is the administrative state, and not the concept of democracy, that
embodies these commitments. As soon as we invoke the term "de-
mocracy," therefore, we are smuggling outmoded values, that will in-
evitably conflict with the government we actually possess, into our po-
litical discourse. Consequently, this Article proposes that we simply
set the term "democracy" aside and cease using it in scholarly discus-
sions of modern government. It then uses microanalysis to propose a
different way of looking at contemporary government and, more spe-
cifically, at the relationship between that government and its citizens
that we now describe in terms of democracy. The Article argues that
this relationship can be more accurately described in terms of interac-
tion that occurs through the mechanisms of elections and administra-
tion. Describing these interactions without invoking the concept of
democracy provides a picture of contemporary government-citizen re-
lations that is fully consonant with the state's administrative character,
and that also reflects our genuine political commitments.
Democracy is an "essentially contested concept," in William Con-
nolly's terms, on which agreement can never be achieved." Such dis-
agreement may be frustrating, but it does not destroy the value of the
contested term. The term "democracy" can serve as an arena in which
contending parties test the strength of their perspectives, or as a prize
to be gained by the side that can assert the most convincing argu-
ments. The problem with treating it in this fashion is that the arena it
creates is not merely an open space, but a highly structured one that
favors some contestants over others, or, more precisely, forces all of
them to distort their competitive efforts. It embeds premodern con-
cepts and values that exaggerate the significance of certain political
mechanisms, underestimate the significance of others, and generate
unwarranted dissatisfaction with the government we actually possess.
Like asking the contestants to fight with broadswords or debate in
Latin, it privileges antiquarian arguments over those that are more
relevant to contemporary conditions.
It is common to condemn aspects of our government as anti-
democratic-judicial review is a well known target-but the character-
istic features of the administrative state receive even more criticism on
this ground. The reason, it will be argued, is not that the administra-
tive state violates our genuine political values, but that the traditional
8 WiLLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMiS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 10 (3d ed. 1993).
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conception of democracy incorporates a variety of anti-administrative
sentiments that cannot otherwise be justified. We will think more
clearly about the government we actually possess if we abandon the
term "democracy" as an instrument of analysis and seek to describe
the situations to which it refers in other ways.
There is, of course, a certain danger in this enterprise. Although
the meaning of the term "democracy" may be contested, everyone be-
lieves in it these days. It is the temple at which all modem political
leaders worship. Current debate tends to focus on who is defiling this
edifice or claiming entrance when supposedly unjustified in doing so.
The point of the following inquiry, however, is not to attack our cur-
rent form of government. Rather, it is to ask whether the concept of
democracy really serves as a good description of that government, or
whether it is just a facade that conceals a different reality. Obviously,
there is no serious possibility that this term will not continue to be
used in political discourse. The point of this Article is to argue that
the term should not be used, and certainly not used reflexively, in le-
gal and political analysis.
Part I of this Article discusses the original meaning and subse-
quent evolution of the term "democracy." Part II traces the way this
traditional concept of democracy has insinuated itself into contempo-
rary democratic theory and undermined its relevance. In Parts III and
V, an alternative description of modem government is advanced, us-
ing the concept of interaction in place of democracy. Part III dis-
cusses electoral interactions, and Part IV discusses interactions at the
administrative level.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE TERM "DEMOCRACY"
A. Democracy and Direct Democracy
The term "democracy" comes from ancient Greece.9 It disap-
peared as a practice with the rise of the Roman Empire and as a con-
cept with the Empire's decline, re-entering European thought only
when Aristotle's Politics'0 was translated into Latin by William of Moer-
It first appears in the writings of Herodotos. See RAPHAEL SEALEV, THE ATHENIAN
REPUBLIC 98-102 (1987) (describing the early history and usage of the term "democ-
racy").
I. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (Benjamin Jowett trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1905) (n.d.).
For general commentary on the Politics, see CURTISJOHNSON, ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF
THE STATE 1 (1990) (analyzing the Politics around the question, "What is the state, or
constitution?"); FRED D. MILLER, JR., NATURE, JUSTICE, AND RIGHTS IN ARISTOTLE'S
2001]
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beke around 1260." Discussion of democracy became part of Western
culture at that time and has continued in an unbroken and ever-
expanding stream until the present day.
When Aristotle wrote about democracy, he meant direct democ-
racy, in which all citizens are "to rule and be ruled in turn. " ' Thus, a
government is a democracy to the extent
that the appointment to all offices, or to all but those which require ex-
perience and skill, should be made by lot; ... that no one should hold
the same office twice, or not often, except in the case of military offices;
that the tenure of all offices, or of as many as possible, should be
brief;... that the assembly should be supreme over all causes, or at any
rate over the most important, and the magistrates over none or only over
a very few.
13
When these conditions are not satisfied-when most offices are
filled by election, are held for long terms, or involve an extensive poli-
cymaking role-the government is not a democracy but an oligarchy,
even if all the citizens participate in the elections. In fact, "when only
selected individuals and not the whole people share in the delibera-
tions of the state, then, although... [these individuals] observe the
law, the government is a pure oligarchy.' 4 Sparta's constitution is a
mixture of democracy and oligarchy, in Aristotle's view, because in
addition to its democratic elements, such as the fact that all the citi-
zens eat the same food and wear similar clothing, it has a number of
oligarchic elements: "that all offices are filled by election and none by
lot, is one of these oligarchical characteristics; that the power of in-
flicting death or banishment rests with a few persons is another.""
PoLrITcs 3 (1995) (analyzing the political theory and constitutional applications of
Aristotle's Politics); W.L. NEWMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 1 (1973)
(providing the translation of a textual commentary on the Politics); MARY NICHOLS,
CITIZENS AND STATESMEN: A STUDY OF ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 3 (1992) (examining Ar-
istotle's argument that humans are by nature political animals). See generally CYN.rHtI
FARRAR, THE ORIGINS OF DEMOCRATIC THINKING: THE INVENTION OF POLITICS IN
CLASSICAL ATHENS 3 (1988) (examining early democratic thought outside of Aris-
totle's influence); M.I. FINLEY, POLITICS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 10 (1983) (conduct-
ing a comparative analysis of ancient Greek and Roman politics).
11 See R.R. BOLGAR, THE CLASSICAL HERITAGE AND ITS BENEFICIARIES 229 (1954)
(discussing William of Moerbeke's translation of the Politics); JOSEPH CANNING, A
HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT 300-1450, at 125-26 (1996).
12 ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at 239.
13 Id. at 239-40. The idea of governing by assembly was not limited to democracies,
but was common in Greek city-states. Democracies differed largely in the scope of de-
cisionmaking authority that the assembly exercised. See SEALEY, supra note 9, at 92-96
(describing the nature of ancient Greek assemblies).
14 ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at 177.
15 Id. at 166. Aristotle's subsequent analysis of democracy is not quite consistent.
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Until the late eighteenth century, the term "democracy" retained
this Aristotelian association with direct democracy.'6 The difficulty
with the term's adoption into the Western political tradition is that it
is not very useful-it has no relationship to any government that has
ever existed in the post-classical, Western world. As Benjamin Con-
stant and, more recently, Giovanni Sartori have noted, the Greek polis
was really a community rather than a modern state." At the time the
Politic5 was translated, a few small republics, such as the Swiss cantons
and the city-states of northern Italy and the Netherlands, bore a su-
perficial resemblance to Aristotle's democracies. Their governmental
structure was quite different, however, and, in any case, they proved to
be a dead end in the development of Western government." The
He describes the characteristics of democracy as including "the election of officers by
all out of all." Id. at 239. He goes on, however, to qualify this by stating "that all
should rule over each, and each in his turn over all" and "that the appointment to all
offices, or to all but those which require experience and skill, should be made by lot."
Id. at 239-40. Thus, Aristotle's reference to elections, which is paralleled in his in-
credibly elaborate discussion of the ways in which officials can be selected, seems to
mean that an election can be consistent with democracy provided that it is an election
ithout nominations-that is, where all the citizens are eligible to vote at the time the
election is held. See id. at 182-84. Alternatively, he might even mean that the election
must not be based on any definitive criteria, such as birth or merit, although this seems
a bit peculiar. The most plausible possibility, suggested by the qualification that "all
should rule over each, and each in his turn over all," is that electing an official is
democratic as long as the elected position tends to circulate through the citizenry over
time rather than being limited to a particular group, or, to use contemporary parlance,
an elite. Id. at 239-40. Modern equivalents might be the election of the chair by an
academic department or executive officers by a small social club. Any political election
in modern society is quite remote from this model, however, and accurately described
by Aristotle's formula for oligarchy.
]" So, THE FEDERALiST No. 10, at 58 (James Madison) (The Modern Library ed.,
1941) (defining "a pure democracy... [as) a society consisting of a small number of
citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person"); THE FEDERALIST
No. 14, at 81 (James Madison) (The Modern Library ed., 1941) ("[T]he natural limit
of a democracy is that distance from the central point which will just permit the most
remote citizens to assemble as often as their public functions demand, and will include
no greater number than can join in those functions ...."). The term that Madison
used for the government created by the Constitution was "republic." See also Marci A.
Hamilton, Repr s&ntation and Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20 G.ARDOzO L. REv. 807,
809-14 (1999) (discussing the skepticism of the Framers of the Constitution toward
direct democracy).
1- BENJAMIN CONSTANT, POUTICAL WRITINGS 313-28 (Biancamaria Fontana ed. &
trans., 1988); GIOVA,,ANI SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 250-57 (1962). For discussions
of the actual operation of Athenian democracy, see ARISTOTLE, THE ATHENIAN
CONSTITUTION (P.J. Rhodes trans., Penguin Books 1984) (n.d.); MOGENS HERMAN
H XNSEN, THE ATHENIN DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF DEMOSTHENES (J.A. Crook trans.,
1991).
S,; e.-., M.V. CLARKE, THE MEDIEVAL CIT' STATE (1926) (examining the prob-
lems of internal government and the struggle to survive that medieval society faced);
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modem nations that we characterize as democracies are, of course,
representative governments, and the disjunction between direct de-
mocracy and representative government is a dominant theme in po-
litical science, as Edmund Burke,"' Carl Schmitt," and Hanna Pitkin 2'
have discussed.
In fact, the development of representative government-certainly
one of the triumphs of Western culture-owes virtually nothing to the
traditional concept of democracy. Rather, it is the product of medie-
val corporatism. In the Middle Ages, people struggled to conceptual-
ize their collective organizations, such as the Church, guilds, trading
companies, universities, and towns." Once they had done so, they
needed a further conception if these entities were to play a role in
governance. The nobles could participate directly and the clergy
could participate either directly or through hierarchical assignments,
but the towns, and the growing bourgeoisie that inhabited them,
needed a more particular mechanism. The mechanism they devel-
oped was representation, and its basic elements, as Gaines Post and
HENRI PIRENNE, EARLY DEMOCRACIES IN THE Low COUNTRIES: URBAN SOCIETY ,)ND
POLITICAL CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND THE RENAISSANCE (J.V. Saunders trans.,
1963) (discussing economic, political, and social features of low country towns):
DANIEL WALEY, THE ITALIAN CITY-REPUBLICS (1969) (contrasting city-states with the
modem political sphere); Quentin Skinner, The Italian City Republics, in DEMOCRACY:
THE UNTINISHEDJOURNEY 57 (John Dunn ed., 1992) (discussing the political history of
the Italian city-republics). In fact, citizenship in a Greek polis had a racial component:
even free men were excluded if they could not demonstrate some ancestral link to the
city. Cleisthenes may have relaxed this rule in Athens when he organized the ten
tribes (demes), but it was subsequently reasserted. SeeJOHN MYRES, THE POLITICAL
IDEAS OF THE ANCIENT GREEKS 347-51 (1968).
19 See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE (P.J.
Marshall ed., 1980).
20 See, e.g., CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMiENTARY DEMOCRACY (Ellen Ken-
nedy trans., 1985) (criticizing the inconsistencies of representative democracy). For
discussions of Schmitt's analysis, see JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY
AND POLITICAL THEORY 201-06 (1992); Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions: A
Proposal to Replace the Myth of Self-Rule with an Attorneyship Model of Representation, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 477, 523-44 (1994).
21 See, e.g., Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, in REPRESENTATION
1, 1-23 (Hanna Fenichel Pitkin ed., 1969).
2 See ERNST H. KANTOROWICz, THE KING'S TWO BODIES 273-313 (1957) (address-
ing features of continuity prevalent in early modem western corporate bodies);
JACQUES LE GOFF, TIME, WORK, AND CULTURE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 135-49 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 1980) (analyzing relations between universities and public
authorities from the twelfth to the seventeenth centuries); J.P. Canning, Law, Sover-
eignty and Corporation Theory, 1300-1450, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL
POLmCAL THOUGHT 454, 454-76 (J.H. Bums ed., 1988) (examining the influence of
juristic theory on political ideas from the late thirteenth to the mid-fifteenth centu-
ries).
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Arthur Monahan point out, came from Roman civil law.2' One ele-
ment-useful for resolingjoint interests in a single subject matter-
was the principle that "what touches all similarly is to be approved by
all." A second element was that a procurator, or proctor, could act
in another's place, or represent that person. When these and other
conceptual elements were combined, it generated the idea that a col-
lective entity could select a person, by the joint action of its members,
who would then act on the entity's behalf.
Representative legislatures are central to the modern Western
governments that call themselves democracies. In parliamentary gov-
ernments, the legislature possesses the most extensive authority,
whereas in presidential systems, the legislature shares this authority
with an elected chief executive. Substantial decisions are never made
by an assembly of the populace at large. The French Revolutionaries,
even in their most extreme moments of relying on the brute force of
the mob, never tried to assemble the populace in any authorized ca-
pacity, but struggled with various representational formulas."  Even
the ratification of the American Constitution, where "we the people"
spoke outside the existing governmental structure, was performed by
representatives.26 While some American states hold public referenda
on election days, usually concerning secondary, idiosyncratically se-
lected issues, these are far removed from governing through popular
assembly. "7 To be sure, modern nations are much too large for the
"1 S'e ARTHUR P. MONAHAN, CONSENT, COERCION AND LIMIT: THE MEDIEVAL
ORIGINS OF PARLIAMEN-TARY DEMOCRACV 97-133 (1987) (discussing the development of
legal concepts in the thirteenth century, particularly in England, France, and northern
Italy); GAINES POST, STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LEGAL THOUGHT: PUBLIC LAW AND THE
STATE, 1100-1322, at 91-238 (1964) [hereinafter POST, STUDIES] (discussing the rise of
representation, medieval assemblies, and parliaments); Gaines Post, A Roman Legal
Tlo'ii of Consent, Quod Omnes Tangit, in Medieval Representation, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 66.
"z "Quod omnes similiter tangit, ab omnibus compobetur." CODE JUST. 5.59.5
(Lampadius & Orestes 531); see also POST, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 164-66 (discussing
the maxim and its knowledge by English legal scholar Henry de Brocton, who exam-
ined the importance of Roman law for English common law).
- See Biancamaria Fontana, Democracy and the French Revolution, in DEMOCRACY:
THE UNFINISHEDJOURNEV. supra note 18, at 107, 117-21 (discussing the structure of the
French Asembly during the French Revolution era).
See 2 BRUCE ACKER.NMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORIMATIONS 57-68 (1998) (de-
scribing the states' decisions to hold a constitutional convention); M.E. BRADFORD,
ORIGINAL INTENTION (1993); CARL VAN DOREN, THE GREAT REHEARSAL 176-238
(1948) (providing a detailed account of the drafting and ratifying of the Constitution).
7 See generally THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACv: THE POLITICS OF
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL (1989) (analyzing the development, benefits,
and problems of direct democracy devices); DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION:
VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1984) (examining direct
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populace to assemble in its entirety, but the populace is never even
gathered in small groups, which might be feasible. Moreover, exten-
sive use of interactive television or the internet could overcome the
size problem and allow citizens to state their views directly to each
other and the government, but there does not seem to be any move-
ment in this direction among political participants. This suggests, as
Rousseau in fact acknowledged notwithstanding his enthusiasm for
211direct democracy, that the impediments to direct democracy are
primarily conceptual rather than technological.
Representative government, moreover, does not end the list of po-
litical developments in Western society. As Max Weber observed,2'
and innumerable political theorists have subsequently affirmed, a fur-
ther transformation has occurred due to the advent of the administra-
tive state."0 Our government now consists primarily of a vast number
of appointed, specially trained officials, employed full-time and organ-
ized in hierarchical institutions. They are not representatives whose
task is to reflect the desires of a group of citizens, and they are cer-
tainly not Aristotle's randomly selected citizens who would reflect the
citizenry's general attitudes and serve for short periods of time.
Among contemporary institutions, only a jury--that most unadminis-
trative of governmental institutions-is organized according to these
principles. In short, even the traditional Western concept of repre-
sentative democracy is itself out of date.
legislation, including ballot initiatives and popular references); DAVID D. SCHMIDT,
CITIZEN LAW.,MAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION (1989) (discussing the
popularity of ballot initiatives from the 1960s to the 1980s); Elizabeth Garrett, 111o Di-
rects Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 17 (1997) (arguing that direct
democracy is as susceptible to interest group pressures as legislative Iawmaking); David
B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66
U. COLO. L. REv. 13 (1995) (analyzing and critiquing the modem use of direct de-
mocracy mechanisms).
28 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 140-53 (Willmoore Kendall
trans., 1954) (addressing how the sovereign authority maintains itself, and discussing
issues concerning deputies and representatives).
29 See 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 217-26 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wit-
tich eds., 1968) (discussing legal authority within a bureaucratic government); 3 id. at
956-1003 (discussing the characteristics of a modem bureaucracy).
,0 See generally MARTIN ALBROW, BUREAUCRACY (1970) (examining the develop-
ment of the concept of bureaucracy); MICHEL CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC
PHENOMENON (1964) (discussing the bureaucratic functioning of human organiza-
tions); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968)
(analyzing how societies undergoing economic and social change can achieve political
stability);JACOBY, supra note 6; 2 MICHAEL MANN, THE SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER 444-
75 (1993) (discussing the role of bureaucracy in the rise of the modern state);
CHARLES TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES, AD 990-1990 (1990)
(comparing features of European cities and states over the past millennium).
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B. Democracy and Mixed Government
The long association of the term "democracy" with the largely
nonemstent political structure of direct democracy is not necessarily
fatal to the term's usefulness in the Western political tradition. The
term can be seen as a convenient way of referring to the rather differ-
ent concept of mixed government. Aristotle used the term mixed
government, or politeia, to describe a constitution, like Sparta's, that
combined the features of democracy and oligarchy.3' Cicero, who
adapted Aristotle's theory, added monarchy to the mixture, produc-
ing a tripartite structure. 2 St. Thomas Aquinas, who also adapted Ar-
istotle, interpreted the government Moses established for the Israelites
as possessing this same tripartite structure,33 thereby adding the
authority of the Old Testament to the luster of the Greeks and Ro-
mans. Unlike direct democracy, this concept of mixed government
possessed genuine descriptive value for Western European regimes.
Venice, the one Italian city-state to retain its republican constitution,
was clearly regarded as a government of this sort, with its Doge, its
aristocratic Senate, and its elected Grand Council. Similarly, Eng-
Set, ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at 162-66. The term politeia has no satisfactory
translation. It is the origin of our word "polity," but we use that term to describe any
government, not one particular variety. In fact, Aristotle acknowledges that the same
problem existed in ancient Greek, see id. at 115, since politeia was the general term for
constitution. Aristotle's explanation of why this general term should be used for a spe-
cific form of constitution is uncharacteristically unrefined. Thus, the word "polity" is
actually a correct translation in that it reproduces the awkwardness and ambiguity of
the original; it is not a useful one, however.
_1 S'e MARCUs TULLIUS CICERO, The Republic, in THE REPUBLIC AND THE LAWS 3, 19-
33 (Niall Rudd trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (discussing the strengths and weak-
nesses of democracy, monarchy, and aristocracy and concluding that a mixed constitu-
tion is the best form); NEAL WOOD, CICERO'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 159-75
(1988) (discussing generally Cicero's life and work, and stating that he expounded a
theory of mixed constitution, which combined monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy).
Regarding "Tully's" (Cicero's) influence during the eighteenth century, see 1 PETER
G,%Y, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: THE RISE OF MODERN PAGANISM 105-09 (1966).
-1- Ste THOMAL.S AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1091-93 (Fathers of the English Do-
minican Province trans., 1981); BRIAN TIERNEY, RELIGION, LAW AND THE GROWTH OF
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT, 1150-1650, at 88 (1982) (discussing the ecclesiastical de-
velopment of the theory of mixed government and stating that Aquinas was the first to
associate "the government of Moses... with the mixed constitution of Aristotle").
, Ste g, nerally WILLIAM J. BOURWSMIA, VENICE AND THE DEFENSE OF REPUBLICAN
LIBERTY (1968) (discussing the Venetian contribution to the Renaissance and to the
general European culture during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries); 1 QUENTIN
SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE RENAISSANCE 139
(1978) (describing Venice as having "the most enduring commitment to the tradi-
tional xalues of independence and self-government"); WALEY, supra note 18, at 11 (dis-
cussing "the republican city-state in northern and central Italy, and in particular... its
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land was viewed as a mixed government, with the King representing
the monarchic principle, the House of Lords representing the aristo-
cratic one, and the House of Commons embodying democracy.>' Be-
cause the King was also recognized as the executive, the House of
Commons as the legislature, and the House of Lords at least partially
as the judiciary, this theory of mixed government developed a vague
association with the separation of powers concept, which was develop-
ing rapidly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries>s6
At this time, "democracy" appears to have been substituted for the
term "mixed government." The term "democracy" was associated with
direct democracy, with the chaotic, and ultimately with the self-
destructive government of ancient Athens. Consequently, most writ-
ers prior to the late eighteenth century used this term the way we
might use the term "mobocracy," to mean the rule of the unruly
populace or the selection of demagogues as state officials. Mixed
government, on the other hand, was regarded as a regime of fairness,
balance, and stability, where each segment of society was represented
and each exercised a salutary restraint upon the other. Radical think-
ing during the English Civil War led, however, to a compurgation of
the term "democracy." James Harrington, who incorporated several
Athenian features into his utopia of Oceana, coined the term anarchy
to describe mob rule and reserved democracy for any regime in which
the populace possessed the leading role." Montesquieu exerted even
social and political life").
35 See 1 WILLIAi BLACKSTONE, COIMENTARIES *48-*51 (discussing the benefits and
detriments of these three forms of government and claiming England supreme be-
cause its government has the best elements of all three) ;J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT
CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 310-14 (1987) (discussing the means through
which England became a mixed government); M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 33 (1967) ("The theory of mixed govern-
ment... remained a part of English political thought well into the nineteenth cen-
try.").
6 SeeVILE, supra note 35, at 39-43 (explaining how England "'transition [ed]' from
the theory of mixed government to the doctrine of the separation of powers").
37 SeeJOHN DUNN, WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY IN THE FACE OF THE FUTURE 5-23
(1979) (explaining the "political conviction which made democracy politically unentic-
ing in the past"); JENNIFER TOLBERT ROBERTS, ATHENS ON TRIAL 26-33 (1984) (de-
scribing the evolution of attitudes toward Athenian democracy); R.R. Palmer, Notes on
the Use of the Word "Democracy, "68 POL. SC. Q. 203 (1953) (discussing the development
and evolution of the term "democracy" from an unpopular concept to its current fa-
vorable status); Ellen Meiksins Wood, Democracy: An Idea of Ambiguous Ancestry, in
ATHENIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
59 (J. Peter Euben et al. eds., 1994) (discussing the evolution of the term "democ-
racy").
ra SeeJAIES HARRINGTON, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in THE POLITICL WORKS
OFJAMES HARRINGTON 155, 162-64 (J.GA. Pocock ed., 1977) (characterizing the cor-
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greater influence when he used the term to mean a republic ruled by
the "people as a body," contrasted with republics ruled by aristocra-
cies.-" ' According to Jennifer Roberts and Gordon Wood, the Ameri-
can revolutionaries began with the standard admiration of mixed gov-
ernment and distrust of democracy." But by the time they adopted
the Constitution, they were beginning to reject mixed government,
with its implicit recognition of nobility,4' and, encouraged by Montes-
quieu, embrace the fearsome term "democracy. 42 This usage of "de-
mocracy" spread throughout Europe during the nineteenth century.
De Tocqueville used it in his description of America and George
Grote supported it with his scholarly rehabilitation of ancient Athe-
nian government." By the end of the century, democracy had ac-
quired the sacrosanct character that it currently possesses, at least in
America, Great Britain, and France.
Given this evolution, the disjunction between the traditional and
modern uses of the term "democracy" would not seem problematic. A
wide range of writers, from Aristotle to Cicero to Aquinas to Montes-
quieu, have recognized that mixed governments would be virtuous
ruption of democracy, the rule of the people, as anarchy).
CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 10-
15 (Anne Cohler et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748).
41 See ROBERTS, supra note 37, at 174-93 (describing the historical origins of the
former American aversion to direct democracy); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERIC,%N REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 197-98 (1969) [hereinafter WOOD, CREATION]
(stating that Americans believed "[a] mixed or balanced government
was... preferable" to a monarchy or complete democracy); Gordon S. Wood, Democ-
rat and the American Revolution, in DEMOCRACv. THE UNFINISHEDJOURNEV, supra note
18, at 92 ("Britons in Europe and America were so uneasy over the impracticality and
instability of pure democracy that democracy was commonly used vituperatively to dis-
credit any untoward tendency toward popular government.").
n See gnoemally WOOD, CREATION, supra note 40, at 64-65, 118, 423-24 (discussing
the American hostility toward nobility). Wood quotes a contemporary newspaper as
complaining: "While we are pleasing and amusing ourselves with Spartan constitutions
on paper, a very contrary spirit reigns triumphant in all ranks.... Spartan constitu-
tions and Roman manners, peculiar to her declining state, never will accord." Id. at
423.
" Se id. at 222-35, 580-87 (discussing the political discourse and machinations that
led the members of the constitutional convention to adopt a representative govern-
ment and define it as democracy). But see supra note 16 (citing continued rejection of
the term "democracy" by Madison in The Federalist).
l' See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEvILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Reeve trans.,
Frances Bowen & Phillips Bradley eds., Random House 1945) (1835) (associating the
term "democracy" uith the American government consistently throughout the text as
the author expounds on his perceptions of America in its earliest days).
" See 1 GEORGE GROTE, A HISTORY OF GREECE FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE
CLOSE OF THE GENERATION CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT (2d ed.
1862).
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and stable. Finding the term "mixed government" a bit awkward, we
have simply replaced it with the term "democracy." All that is needed
to achieve verbal clarity is to remember that at some time in the early
nineteenth century the usage switched, and what had been called
mixed government until that time was subsequently described as de-
mocracy.
This, however, is not a satisfactory solution. While the mixed or
middle constitution Aristotle describes may combine oligarchic and
democratic elements, allowing for more extensive use of elections,
and the Ciceronian addition of the monarchy reflects the existence of
a chief executive, neither effectively describes modem representative
and administrative government. In fact, Aristotle's discussion of the
methods by which a polis could mix oligarchy and democracy-that it
could combine them, average them, or take parts from each-sounds
more like a mathematical formula or a cookbook recipe than a politi-
cal theory precisely because he cannot conceive of new strategies such
as representation or indirect elections.
Moreover, Aristotle's concept of a politeia, or mixed government,
is just as distant from an administrative state as his concept of democ-
racy. More extensive use of elections would allow some specialization
of functions-even Athens elected all its military and some of its fi-
nancial officers. But while an administrative state is also specialized, it
does not choose these specialized officials by election. Conversely, Ar-
istotle makes no allowance for a hierarchy of appointed salaried offi-
cials and seems adamantly opposed to specialized training that would
separate a person from the general run of citizens on the basis of
knowledge rather than virtue. The state that best embodies the fea-
tures of mixed government, in Aristotle's view, is Sparta,5 which was
even more unadministrative than Athens and bears a closer relation-
ship to some place that the Starship Enterprise would come across
than to any modern Western nation."'
Theories of democracy do not end with Aristotle, of course. Even
if he accurately stated and decisively elaborated the original meaning
of that term, there is no necessary reason why the word cannot be ap-
propriated by modem writers and used in connection with contempo-
rary structures. Indeed, that is precisely what has occurred: contem-
porary theories of democracy are legion, and most of them have
received sophisticated theoretical elaboration and extensive empirical
ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at 166.
46 This was recognized at the time of the founding. See supra note 41 and accom-
panying text.
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support. These theories, however, have not freed themselves from Ar-
istotelian political concepts. Instead, those concepts are sedimented
into the term "democracy." We may think that we have appropriated
the term for our own uses, exercising control over its meaning, but
the term is more likely to exercise control over us, challenging us with
questions fiom our vaguely recollected past such as: "Shouldn't all
your decisions be made by an assembly of the entire populace?
Shouldn't public officials be selected by lot, so that each of you may
rule and then be ruled in turn?"
The problem, as stated, is that direct democracy is quite foreign to
representative government and is virtually the antithesis of the mod-
ern administrative state. As a result, these embedded associations
mean that our continued use of the term "democracy" creates a con-
tinuous tension with the government we actually possess. It beclouds
our ability to describe that government, leading us to overlook or un-
derestimate features that are central to that government's operation
and to imagine or overemphasize other features that are of minimal
importance. Democracy is not merely a descriptive term, however; it
also possesses such powerful normative associations that "democratic"
is virtually a synonym for good or desirable in modern political and
academic discourse, while "nondemocratic" is virtually the worst thing
that can be said about a government. Thus, the term's embedded as-
sociations are likely to exercise a certain control over our judgments.
Since these associations are quite foreign to the government we actu-
ally possess, use of the term leads to a sustained bias against modern
government, particularly against its administrative features that are
most foreign to the concept and practice of direct democracy. Of
course, the government we presently possess should not be immu-
nized from criticism, but it should be criticized on the basis of genu-
ine political values, not semiconscious or instinctive attitudes that
were embedded in our terminology by theories that we no longer ac-
cept.
II. CURRENT THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY
The extent to which continued use of the term "democracy," with
its embedded associations, distorts both our descriptive and our nor-
mative accounts of modern government can be illustrated by the lead-
ing theories of democracy. Four such theories will be considered
here: self-government, which comes in both liberal and participatory
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forms; elitism; pluralism, with its step-sister, public choice; and delib-
erative democracy.47 Each is a vast topic and cannot be fully can-
vassed. The principal point of the discussion is to demonstrate how
these descriptively plausible and normatively meaningful approaches
to government have become convoluted and confused by their efforts
to characterize themselves as theories of democracy.
A. Self-Government and Participatory Democracy
The concept of self-government, or popular sovereignty, is a natu-
ral starting point. It is the oldest of the modem theories of democ-
racy, and the only one that is prominent among political leaders and
ordinary citizens. The theory was featured in Thomas Paine's polemi-
cal writings,48 the Preamble to the United States Constitution, ' and
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. 5 One element of the concept is politi-
cal independence-a particular group of people do not govern them-
selves if they are controlled by someone outside that group. While
this is regarded as a necessary condition for democracy, and one that
would be particularly salient to a rebelling colony like the United
States, it is obviously not sufficient. A further requirement is that this
independent group cannot be dominated by a monarchy, a hereditary
aristocracy, or any other predefined subgroup, but must be controlled
by the populace at large."' Such control is generally conceived as be-
ing exercised through the election of the nation's leaders. According
to the classic liberal thinkers, such as Locke, Montesquieu, Madison,
47 Cf Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 GCRDOZO L. RE-%. 795, 795-96
(1999) (arguing that the very multiplicity of views might be regarded as a source of
suspicion about the coherence of the concept). The point here, however, is that all
these conflicting iews share a premodem core.
48 THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, in RIGHTS OF MAN, COMMON SENSE AND OTHER
POLITIcMAL WRITINGS 7 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (1776) (stating that as a population
grows, it becomes more convenient for the people to "consent[] to leave the legislative
part to be managed by a select number chosen from the whole body, who are sup-
posed to have the same concerns at stake which those have who appointed them, and
who will act in the same manner as the whole body would act were they present").
49 "We the People of the United States ... do ordain and establish this Constitu-
tion for the United States of America." U.S. CONST. pmbl.
50 "[G]overnment of the people, by the people." Abraham Lincoln, The Gettys-
burI Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in 5 ENC&'CLOPEDIA BRTA,,NICA 229 (1990).
Quentin Skinner states that fourteenth-century Italians believed that these two
criteria were necessary to defend their liberties: "[O]ne wsas the idea of their right to
be free from any outside control of their political life... the other was the idea of
their corresponding right to govern themselves as they thought fit." SKINNER, supra
note 34, at 6.
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and Mill, elections are the essential component of democracy. 2 The
conceptual starting point of this assertion is the idea that people are
basically concerned with living their own lives and have a right to do
so. But since people's interests invariably clash, as Madison ob-
served, this right, as well as others, can only be secured by govern-
ment. The government, however, will only safeguard people's rights if
its leaders are elected by the people themselves. This is often quali-
fied by the observation that the leaders are not inherentiy trustworthy.
Consequently, a leader's willingness to safeguard people's rights must
be secured by structural and substantive constraints, such as the sepa-
ration of powers and legally enforceable claims by individuals.54
As a description of contemporary government, much of this ac-
count is unassailable, but characterizing it as self-government raises
formidable difficulties. One commonly stated difficulty is that the
structural and substantive constraints are counter-majoritarian, or an-
tidemocratic. This tension between democracy and constitutionalism,
however, can be resolved by simply acknowledging that they constitute
two separate principles. A more essential problem is that the term
self-government is an oxymoron because the basic concept of govern-
ance is that one person rules over another. It makes sense to say that
one rules over oneself only if the self is seen as divided into two oppos-
ing parts, such as reason and emotion. Applied to the political realm,
this concept suggests that a nation achieves self-government to the ex-
tent that one aspect of its totality, or populace, rules over another as-
pect of that same totality. Whatever this might mean, it clearly con-
flicts with representative government. In such a government, it is the
Se ge2TrrallV ANTHONY H. BIRCH, THE CONCEPTS AND THEORIES OF MODERN
DEMOCRATC 45-68 (1993) (discussing the multiple theories of democracy espoused by
the different contingents among our founding fathers); DAVID HELD, MODELS OF
DEMOCRACY 70-120 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing generally the extent to which the voice of
the people influences and plays an active role in different theories of democracy, in-
cluding those of Locke, Montesquieu, Madison, and Mill).
_"S,r THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (stating that factions would
threaten the stability of the newly constructed union).
I' This is the central argument of the legal process school regarding judicial pro-
tection of individual rights. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 17 ("Representative democra-
cies-that is to say, all working democracies-function by electing certain men for cer-
tain periods of time, then passing judgment periodically on their conduct of public
office.");JESSE H. CHOPER,JUDICLAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 2
(1980) ("[A]lthough judicial review is incompatible with a fundamental precept of
American democracy-majority rule-the Court must exercise this power in order to
protect individual rights.... ."); ELY, supra note 1, at 77-86 (arguing that representative
democracy has faults that can result in the violation of minorities' rights and that the
courts can remedy these faults).
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representatives who are ruling, not the populace.
The advent of the administrative state exponentially increases the
difficulties that political representation creates for the theory of self-
government. An administrative state is not governed by elected repre-
sentatives, but by a vast number of appointed, specially trained, hier-
archically organized officials. Elections provide the means of choos-
ing a small number of representatives who are authorized to issue
commands to these officials and to supervise their performance in
various ways, thereby exercising only partial control over their actions.
Administrators make the vast majority of government decisions, in-
cluding many of the most important ones, on their own. In short,
elected representatives are only partially responsive to the voters be-
cause the inherent limitations of the representative and administrative
processes limit voter control over the government. Any control that
the people themselves exercise over governmental operations is thus
doubly attenuated by the intervening representatives and administra-
tors, and far removed from anything that could plausibly be described
as self-government.
Popular sovereignty, a concept that Gordon Wood attributes to
the American revolutionaries, 5' is no better than self-government in
describing the populace's role in an administrative state. The term
itself is another oxymoron because sovereign originally meant a king
or monarch. 6 There is something odd about using the term to de-
scribe any aspect of a modern representative republic. 57 The most
55 See WOOD, CREATION, supra note 40, at 445-53, 524-47 (stating that the recogni-
tion of a sovereign public resolved the conceptual problem of dividing governmental
authority among three branches while maintaining a supreme and unitary soxereign
federal government).
56 For the classic statement, see JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY 4 (Julian H. Frank-
lin trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1576) (promoting a theory of royal absolut-
ism where sovereignty is indivisible). For an analysis of the construction of sovereignty,
see MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER AND THE SOVEREIGN
STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995)
(examining the concept of sovereignty and how it is applied in theory and practice);
MICHAEL WILKS, THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE LTER MIDDLE AGES (1963)
(exploring sovereignty through an interpretation of the role of the papal monarchy).
57 See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULkR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 58-64 (1988) (stating that popular sovereignty
is an argument that legislators used to justify their independent authority, not a dexice
for ensuring representation of the people's interests). For another argument that the
American revolutionaries did not really free themselves from this concept, but simply
transferred their idea of a sovereign from the king to the Continental Congress, see
JERRILYN GREENE MARSTON, KING AND CONGRESS: THE TRANSFER OF POLITICXL
LEGITIMACY, 1774-1776 (1987).
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charitable interpretation is that "sovereign" refers to the ultimate or
supreme authority in that republic, but this tells us nothing unless we
define the word supreme. One can conclude that the populace or
electorate occupies this role by asserting that the supreme authority is
the one that chooses or elects the leaders of the government, without
being ordered or coerced. This does not change the fact that the vot-
ers do not govern, but only exercise an uncertain, secondary control
over the government's administrative apparatus.
In short, the liberal theory of self-government appears to be
driven by an embedded commitment to the concept of direct democ-
racy, rather than by any effort to grasp the realities of the representa-
tive, administrative state. According to Aristotle, a democracy is a
government where citizens rule and are ruled in turn, where all major
issues are decided in an assembly, and where government officials are
selected by lot and rule for brief periods of time. It is Aristotle and his
intellectual progeny who are whispering to us, through the borrowed
concept, that the people should govern themselves. We have devel-
oped a form of government that is unique to us and was unknown to
him. It is a government that includes a wide range of mechanisms for
ensuring that it benefits the people, including representative legisla-
tures, elected chief executives, judicial review, and elaborate adminis-
trative hierarchies. It embodies many important values, but it simply
does not implement the foreign, vaguely defined concept of self-
government.
These descriptive defects of liberal theory are widely recognized5 8
One possible response is to abandon the concept of self-government
entirely and seek ways of improving the representative, administrative
government we actually possess. But because self-government is re-
garded as a component of democracy, or indeed, as the essence of
democracy, and democracy is regarded as sacrosanct, few people are
willing to take this approach. Instead, the most common response is a
normatively based rejection of the liberal model of human beings and
government and an attempt to reconstruct the latter, and possibly the
former, so that self-government can be secured. This complex body
of scholarship is generally described as participatory democracy. John
-" See. e.€., ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRAG' AND ITS CRITICS (1989) (exploring com-
peting theories of anarchism and elitism and proposing a democratic theory embody-
ing future needs); SARTORI, supra note 17 (reviewing major democratic theories);
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCLALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942) (exploring
the historical and theoretical underpinnings of socialism and democracy).
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Stuart Mill may be regarded as one of its progenitors, 59 and the theme
has since been renewed by communitarians such as Amitai Etzioni,
Michael Sandel, and Philip Selznick," neo-Marxists such as C.B. Mac-
pherson, Ralph Miliband, and Nicos Poulantzas,6' industrial demo-
crats such as John Burnheim, G.D.H. Cole, Carol Gould, Paul Hirst,
and Robert Dahl in his later work, 2 English idealists such as Bernard
Bosanquet and T.H. Green, 63 civic republicans such as HannahArendt, Benjamin Barber, Jane Mansbridge, Frank Michelman, and
59 See MILL, supra note 2 (considering bureaucracy as one of the infirmities to
which representative government is liable); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859),
reprinted in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 249 (Max Lerner ed., 8th ed.
1971) (arguing that freedom is found in the attitudes of people themselves, and that
tyranny of the majority is as dangerous as tyranny of the state).
6o See, e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNIrY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES
AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993) (offering a positive and normative analysis
of communitarianism); MICHAELJ. SANDEL, DEMOcRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN
SEARCH OFA PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996) (exploring contemporary political philosophy
and why it is both unrealizable and unavoidable); PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL
COMMONTALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY (1992) (discuss-
ing moral institutions and community).
61 See, e.g., C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1977)
(reviewing the major democratic theories and suggesting that participator), democracy
is liberal democracy); C.B. MACPHERSON, THE REAL WORLD OF DEMOCRACY (1966)
(offering a theory of liberal democracy and liberalism generally); RALPH MILIBAND,
THE STATE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY (1969) (giving a neo-Marxist interpretation of the
state system, state elite, and role of government); NICOS POULANIZAS, CLASSES IN
CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM (David Fernbach trans., 1975) (exploring the relationship
between the bourgeoisie and the state); NICOS POULANTZAS, POLITICAL POWER AND
SOCIAL CLASS (Timothy O'Hagan trans., 1973) (examining the capital state through it%
class system, concept of power, and state regimes).
62 See, e.g., JOHN BURNHEIM, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE?: THE ALTERNATIVE TO
ELECTORAL POLITICS (1985) (suggesting that democracy does not exist in practice and
that other organizations guide the polity); G.D.H. COLE, THE CASE FOR INDUSTRIAL
PARTNERSHIP (1957) (considering the status of the average working individual in Great
Britain and how the government could better address his or her absolute necessities);
ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1985) (describing the inter-
play between democracy, political equality, and economic liberty); CAROL C. GOULD,
RETHINKING DEMOCRACY: FREEDOM AND SOCIAL COOPERATION IN POLITICS,
ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY (1988) (providing a new democratic theory shaped by devel-
opments in self-management, participation, and democratization in social and cultural
institutions); PAUL HIRST, ASSOCIATIVE DEMOCRACY: NEW FORiS OF ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL GOVERNANCE (1994) (espousing associationalist societies and their advantages
over traditional democracy). For a discussion of Dahl's earlier, better known work, see
infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
63 See, e.g., BERNARD BOSANQUET, THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF THE STATE (4th
ed. 1923) (offering a description of the philosophical theory of the state); THOMAS
HILL GREEN, LECTURES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION (1967) (propos-
ing an Oxford Idealism theory).
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Judith Shklar," social scientists such as Robert Putnam, and even the
Port Huron statement of the Students for a Democratic Society." This
diverse group is unified by the belief that self-government must be re-
stored by facilitating people's active participation in the governmental
process. Some of its members emphasize the idea that citizens can
only realize self-fulfillment through such participation. For others,
the more important issue is that participation is required to make the
government responsive to the people's needs and to combat its lead-
ers' tendency toward self-aggrandizement, self-absorption, or outright
oppressiveness. Most agree with both positions and regard the mini-
mally active voters of the modern state as endangering both the per-
sonal integrity and the political liberty of all individuals.
Like the claim of liberal theory that self-government actually oc-
curs in modem states, the claim of participatory theory that it ought
to occur seems to be derived from the concept of direct democracy.
Mill, for example, considered the best form of government to be one
in which every citizen not only has "a voice in the exercise of [the] ul-
timate sovereignty, but [is], at least occasionally, called on to take an
actual part in government, by the personal discharge of some public
function." 7 We recognize, of course, that this is not our present real-
ity, but the use of the term "democracy" induces us to adopt it as a
norm and then to criticize the government we presently possess be-
cause it falls short of this norm. Let us change our government; let us
change our own personalities so that we can remain within the blessed
ambit of our borrowed terminology.
On reflection, however, the concept of self-government that we
, Se, e.g., H.LNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (2d ed. 1998) (promoting a
political theory colored by the effects of totalitarianism); BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG
DEMOCR C': PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (1984) (conceptualizing thin
democracy and strong democracy as the politics that guide our way of living); JANE J.
NLVNSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1980) (proposing a town meeting gov-
ernment and a participatory workplace); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985
Thrn: Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1986) (suggesting that
our republican tradition informs our normative conception of citizenship); JUDITH N.
SHKILxR, ,iERICA N CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION (1991) (describing the
characteristics of the good citizen and the government in which she participates).
S,e ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 31-64, 336-47 (2000) (lauding the vir-
tues of political and civic engagements by the American citizenry, yet finding a steep
decline in political and community participation).
... Se KIRKEPATRICK SALE, SDS 52-53 (1973) (analyzing the Port Huron Statement
and its promotion of participatory democracy through the sharing of social decision-
making uith individuals and the structuring of society to encourage independence and
common participation).
7 MILL, supra note 2, at 64.
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have derived from democracy is no more desirable as a norm than it is
accurate as a description. Imposing a moral or legal obligation on
people to participate in government is very different from giving them
the opportunity to do so. The opportunity to participate is readily
recognizable as an element of human liberty, like the opportunity to
travel or write poetry. This is a valid norm, being internally coherent
and consistent with the realities of the modern state. The argument
that all people should actively participate in government is, however,
grounded on false consciousness claims. Most people in Western na-
tions choose to avoid participation, even when the opportunity is
readily available. They continue to support the specialized, appointed
hierarchies of the administrative state although the political rhetoric
of our day would easily validate any effort to disband those hierarchies
and decentralize their administrative functions to permit more politi-
cal participation.
False consciousness arguments are epistemologically suspect, since
they demand a strong interpretive overlay. They are particularly dan-
gerous in a political context-a great deal of oppression has resulted,
and a great deal of liberty has been lost, because sincere, self-
righteous people thought they could discern what others needed bet-
ter than those others could themselves. Moreover, a false conscious-
ness argument with respect to self-govemment deconstructs itself
quite rapidly. The basic justification for self-government is that peo-
ple know their own interests and should be able to choose a govern-
ment that will be responsive to those interests. To argue that their
lack of desire to govern themselves fails to reflect their real interests is
a contradiction. Furthermore, if the claim is true, it undercuts the
reason for arguing that people should govern themselves in the first
place.
The second difficulty with adopting participatory self-government
as a norm is its incompatibility with the administrative state. For many
writers, that is the source of its appeal. Mill explicitly identified this
theme, contrasting the virtue of participation with the vices of bu-68
reaucracy. But the administrative state, however decried and de-
spised, is here to stay-in part because it represents our reality and in
part because it possesses a normative appeal of its own. It is our
mechanism-the only one we have been able to create-for socialjus-
tice. It is our means of distributing welfare, protecting the environ-
68 See id. at 114-18 (praising seemingly tedious and drawn out discussions by repre-
sentative assemblies as indicators that lawmakers are addressing all voices of the peo-
ple).
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ment, guarding public health, combating commercial fraud, and op-
posing race and gender inequality. Do we really want to abandon or
dilute all those goals in favor of a concept of democratic self-
government that is unworkable in practice and foreign to our political
tradition?' '
B. Elite Theory
The elite theory of democracy is an outgrowth of the self-
government theory and may be regarded as a sociologically based cri-
tique of it. It has two major strands: an analysis of elected leaders and
an analysis of the electorate. The essential claim regarding demo-
cratic leaders is that these leaders, although elected, are drawn from a
narrow social group and generally reflect that group's ideological
commitments. This group is not necessarily the capitalist class, nor
are its commitments inevitably of an economic character. Thus, al-
though the theory bears a certain resemblance to Marxism, it allows
for a more complex, less deterministic analysis of society and avoids
many of Marxism's theoretical and empirical weaknesses.
Among the major figures in the leadership strand of elite theory
are Robert Michels, C. Wright Mills, and Gaetano Mosca.7" All three
Even more modest levels of participation that would not alter the basic structure
of our government may be difficult to achieve in the modern world, and may not have
the salutary political effects that are often assumed. Robert Putnam attributes the de-
cline in "social capital," which includes political participation, to deep structural fac-
tors such as the decline of the two-parent family, suburbanization, and the growing
influence of the media. See PUTNAM, supra note 65. While his account of the baneful
eftects of this trend on social life is moderately convincing, he cannot sustain his claim
that it has similarly deleterious effects on the political structure. In his chapter entitled
"Democracy," the only quantitative correlation he provides between his relatively high
social capital states (North Dakota, Iowa, and Montana) and democracy is their lower
incidence of tax evasion (and it is a rather weak correlation at that). See id. at 348.
Putnam assumes that the lower level of tax evasion is attributable to a presumed higher
sense of trust among the citizens for each other and for their government. See id. We
could lower the rate of tax evasion by allowing the IRS to execute tax evaders on its
,,vn authority, however, and few people would associate this mechanism with democ-
racy or with inspiring greater trust in government. In general, it is difficult to see why
tax evasion rates have much to do with democratic values. Putnam can only demon-
strate that lower levels of participation lead to lower levels of participation. He has no
exidence, and no argument, that this phenomenon has produced some observable
change in governmental structure.
Se generally MICHELS, supra note 3 (analyzing the characteristics of leadership
and democratic aristocracy); C. WRIGHT MILLs, THE POWER ELITE (1956) (describing
the characteristics and duties of the elite within society); MOSCA, supra note 3 (promot-
ing a theory of the ruling class that combines the practical and theoretical aspects of
human nature). For an argument that Mills's concept of the power elite was closely
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regarded the elite group in a modern democratic state as a sort of
technocratic aristocracy, a group of people with exceptional abilities
or opportunities. Elites are not unique to democratic states, of
course, being found in virtually all societies. The point is that demo-
cratic regimes are not exempt from their control. According to
Michels, any organization is inevitably dominated by its leaders, who
will use their position to favor their own interests rather than the in-
terests of those whom they purportedly represent. Since this is true
for political parties as well, it means that the interests of ordinary citi-
zens will always be ignored, even in a democratic, electoral regime.
Michels labeled this the iron law of oligarchy.
The second strand of elite theory focuses on the sociology of the
voters rather than the leaders. Originated by Joseph Schumpeter,"
and to a lesser extent, Walter Lippmann,72 it was elaborated by Murray
Edelman, the French postmodernists, most notably Jean Baudrillard,
and American postmodernists such as Zygmunt Bauman, Ronald
Collins, and David Skover 7 3 The claim, in essence, is that the voters
are uninformed about the issues at stake in an election and are easily
manipulated and misled by rival politicians. This is not because they
are stupid, but, as Schumpeter points out, because political issues are
so far removed from their daily lives and ordinary knowledge base that
they cannot rely upon the native sagacity and experience that they
display when making more personal decisions. Jfirgen Habermas,
whose earlier work is at least affiliated with this school of thought,
linked to the administrative bureaucracy, see T.B. Bottomore, The Administrative Elite,
in THE NEW SOCIOLOGY 357, 359 (Irving Horowitz ed., 1964).
71 SeeSCHUMPETER, supra note 58 (stating the importance of the human element in
consideration of socialism and democracy).
72 See WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC (1925) (showing how the public
may affect political discourse).
73 See generally JEAN BAUDRILLARD, In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, in IN THE
SHADOW OF THE SILENT MAJORITIES ... OR THE END OF THE SOCIAL AND OTHER ESsAYS
1, 6 (Pai Foss et al. trans., 1983) (claiming that representation of the silent majority is
no longer possible); ZYGMUNT BAUMiAN, MODERNITYAND AMBIVALENCE (1991) (analyz-
ing the problems of ambivalence and indeterminacy); RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAvID
M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE (1996) (examining the culture of discourse in
America and the freedom of speech and press); MURRAY EDELMAN, CONSTRUCTING
THE POLITICAL SPECTACLE (1988) [hereinafter EDELMAN, CONSTRUCTING] (suggesting
that mass democracy is a political spectacle and that political problems are meant to
rouse the masses); MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964) (exam-
ininF how people's different reactions to political actions define the political system).
See SCHUMPETER, supra note 58, at 262 ("Thus the typical citizen drops down to a
lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues
and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere
of his real interests. He becomes a primitive again.").
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provides the most systematic, phenomenologically based analysis of
the problem.7 Every person's individual experience, he argues, con-
stitutes an all-encompassing lifeworld." As long as the forces structur-
ing that lifeworld are contained within it, the external reality that the
individual perceives will be comprehensible and the individual's abil-
ity to evaluate and control her experience will be considerable.77 In
the modern world, however, complex, diffuse, remotely generated
mechanisms, most notably the political and economic systems, colo-
nize the individual's lifeworld, rendering it incomprehensible and re-
ducing the individual to the status of quasi-feral being who gibbers in
amazement at the waning moon.
Voters not only are being asked to make decisions about issues
that are beyond their experience, but also are being systematically
manipulated and befuddled by political leaders. Schumpeter, writing
before the advent of broadcast television, noted the similarity between
political campaigns and advertising, where "mere assertion, often re-
peated, counts more than rational argument and so does the direct
attack upon the subconscious which takes the form of attempts to
evoke and crystallize pleasant associations of an entirely extra-rational,
very frequently of a sexual nature."" The present situation can only
be worse; as Baudrillard and Collins and Skover suggest, political
campaigns are carried out through sound-bites and evocative visual
images that do not even masquerade as arguments."' There is thus no
popular will, no general consensus about the common good, and,
most strikingly, no final set of natural or ideological interests that vot-
ers want to satisfy. The public's political views are essentially based on
emotions, which are largely generated by the politicians who are com-
peting for their votes.
Elite theory has been extensively criticized on both empirical and
See 2 JfTRGEN HABERMJAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: LIFEwORLD
AIND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 153-97 (Thomas McCarthy trans.,
Beacon Press 1987) (1981) (offering a concept of society as the uncoupling of system
and lifeworld).
See id.
77 See id.
SCHUMPETER, supra note 58, at 257-58; see also id. at 263-64 (discussing the manu-
facturing of popular will as analogous to commercial advertising). For an elaboration
of this theme, see COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 73, at 139-84.
7" See JEAN BAUDRILLARD, FATAL STRATEGIES 81-99 (Jim Fleming ed. & Philip
Beitchman & W.G.J. Niesluchowski trans., 1990); COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 73, at
3-45 (examining the influence of mass entertainment media on the cultural direction
of First Amendment freedoms).
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epistemological grounds.8 ° The theory's leadership strand would be
illuminating and insightful if the elite from which the leaders are re-
cruited could be defined independently of their political positions.
But no such definition can be sustained empirically. Even in the Mid-
dle Ages, when the nobility claimed to be a dominant elite and then
justified its claim with genealogies, heraldic crests, castles, falcons,
hunting dogs, and the blessing of the only true Church, commoners
were recruited regularly as the king's leading ministers. At present,
social mobility is significantly more extensive. In the absence of an
independent definition, the elite from which political leaders are cho-
sen can only be identified as the group that produces those same
leaders, which is a definition, as Anthony Birch observes, that is largely
tautological.8s
There is, however, a more sympathetic interpretation of this the-
ory. Rather than asserting the existence of an independently estab-
lished elite, identified by some cabalistic sign, the theory could simply
be observing the ineluctable distortions that arise from the separate
incentives and mentality associated with the role of leadership.
Michels's iron law of anarchy is essentially equivalent to agency theory
in microeconomics: just as the firm's agents tend to favor their own
personal self-interest over the interests of the stockholders, political
leaders tend to favor their own interests at the expense of their fol-
lowers. In addition, the information, life experience, and sense of re-
sponsibility that result from political leadership inevitably generate at-
titudes that differ from those of the average citizen and even from
those that the same individual held prior to acquiring her leadership
position.
The elite analysis of voters can be criticized as equally unempirical
and tautological. While survey data can demonstrate that citizens in a
modern state are not very well informed, it cannot show that they are
manipulated, or that their voting decisions reflect artificially con-
structed inclinations, because no survey can discern their real inter-
ests. Moreover, Schumpeter's empirical assertions are partially re-
80 See, e.g., BIRCH, supra note 52, at 51-53, 169-85 (critiquing the works of various
elite theorists); HELD, supra note 52, at 157-98 (rejecting Schumpeter's theory of com-
petitive elite democracy); CAROL PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY
17-20 (1970) (same); SARTORI, supra note 17, at 40-46 (clarifying the misunderstand-
ings of political realism).
81 See BIRCH, supra note 52, at 177 ("To say that the reins of government must al-
ways be in the hands of a minority is a truism, and to call this minority a ruling class is a
tautology."); id. at 169-70 (noting that virtually all organized societies have political
authority concentrated in the hands of a small group of people).
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futed by his owm definition of democracy as a competition for votes
between rival politicians."2 As is generally true with respect to advertis-
ing, such competition tends to mitigate manipulation. Politicians, like
advertisers, will hasten to point out the distortions and inaccuracies of
their competitors. While the truth of politicians' substantive claims
may be difficult to discern amidst a farrago of conflicting views, the
fact that this difficulty exists is itself a truth that will be accurately
communicated to the voters, furnishing them with the defense of
cynicism. More importantly, politicians in a competitive environment
are likely to be attentive to the voters' wishes. The risky strategy of
manufacturing a new desire, however possible in the abstract, is likely
to seem less appealing than the more cautious one of catering to vot-
ers' existing inclinations.
Here again, however, there is a more modulated, sympathetic in-
terpretation of elite theory's claim. It need not advance a full-blowm
false consciousness argument, but it only needs to emphasize another
set of distortions in the electoral process. In fact, the modern world
presents too many issues and too much information for ordinary vot-
ers to process, at least in the amount of time they are willing to devote
to these often uninteresting matters. One role of political leaders,
particularly when campaigning for election, is to select and structure
the issues and to persuade the voters that these issues are important.
American politicians were a major force in shaping the environmental
movement of the 1970s and the family values movement of the 1980s,
and they succeeded in both instances through the creative and aggres-.... 84
sive use of the mass media, particularly television.
The major difficulty with both the leadership and the electoral
elite theory of democracy does not lie in their description of the con-
temporary political process but in their claim that the description, by
its own force, represents a global condemnation of the modern state's
relationship with its citizens. The overstatements, unjustifiable char-
Sce SCHLUMPETER, supra note 58, at 271 ("[Wg e have restricted the kind of com-
petition for leadership which is to define democraq,, to free competition for a free
vote.").
e S STEVEN J. ROsENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBLIZATION,
PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRAC IN AMERICA 101-17 (1993) (discussing how politicians
mobilize political participation around issues); see also EDELMAN, CONSTRUCnING, supra
note 73, at 37-65 (discussing how political leaders help construct political meaning and
politics).
, Cf Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 945-
76 (1995) (arguing that law can exercise an educative and constructive effect on citi-
zen xalues).
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acterizations, tautological assertions, and despondent conclusions of
elite theory seem to spring from its accompanying emotions. All these
emotions, however, are not justified by any general metric of citizen
control. Modem govemment is controlled by elites, but what gov-
ernment has not been? Modem voters are not fully informed about
political issues, and they rely on leaders to provide both emphasis and
information, but when has the entire populace ever been fully knowl-
edgeable and self-directed?
Once these questions are asked, the answer seems fairly clear.
The only regime that is obviously superior to our own in these re-
spects is the Aristotelian image of direct democracy. In an Aristotelian
democracy, there is no political elite because the officials who control
the state are selected by lot, may not hold the same office twice, and
serve for a fairly brief and clearly delimited period of time. Moreover,
these officials do not even constitute a temporary, situationally de-
fined elite because the assembly of the entire populace is "supreme
over all causes, or at any rate over the most important, and the magis-
trates over none or only over a very few."' In such a democracy,
moreover, the citizens will be well-informed and resistant to manipula-
tion because each person is equally likely to hold office and everyone
participates in the assembly where all major issues are debated and
decided.
As a descriptive matter, a modem administrative state cannot be
governed by an assembly of citizens or run by randomly selected offi-
cials serving for short periods of time. Everyone knows that this ap-
proach is foreign to our own political tradition. Consequently, we do
not use it even for small, simple organizations, like churches, social
clubs, or academic faculties, where it would at least be feasible. The
historically sedimented image of direct democracy functions as an un-
conscious norm. It then becomes a matter of seemingly great descrip-
tive significance that our modem state, which we describe as a democ-
racy, falls short of the norm, or that the state is led by leaders and that
those leaders influence the beliefs of the people. Thus, the use of the
term "democracy" transforms elite theory's plausible but unsurprising
observations into a condemnation, and that condemnation becomes a
normative theory.
Perhaps it could be argued that elite theory, although overstated
and overheated as a description, reflects a genuine commitment.
Even if all societies exhibit the features the theory observes, and even
85 ARISrOTLE, supra note 10, at 240.
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if these features are inevitable, they might still be proper objects of
condemnation. In order for this condemnation to be normatively co-
herent, however, it must rely on genuinely felt values, such as security,
prosperity, and liberty, not on values that have been smuggled into
our thought processes by an historically sedimented term. Leaders
often represent their own interests and oppress the people whom they
rule, but the separation between the leaders and the populace, which
is the reality that lies at the core of elite theory, can have beneficial ef-
fects as well. The size of our modem state, its technological complex-
ity, and the unprecedented level of security and prosperity that it pro-
vides for its citizens require enormous technical expertise on the part
of those who govern. This is obviously true for many appointed offi-
cials, but it is even true for elected ones. It is easy to underestimate
the skills required for this role, but effective legislators and chief ex-
ecutives typically combine genuine aptitude with extensive practical
experience. To fulfill our values, we should not seek to reduce gov-
ernmental expertise but to expand and control it so it serves the in-
strumental purpose of improving people's lives. After all, this is the
core purpose of modem political morality.
Elite theory also correctly maintains that political leaders strongly
affect popular views, "constructing a political spectacle, ' 6 but this can
be beneficial as well. If the issues are so far removed from the lives of
the voters, what precisely are those voters' real interests? What is the
real interest of the average American voter in the preservation of the
Alaskan wilderness or in ensuring that American foreign aid does not
subsidize abortions? The voters' beliefs about these issues are deeply
felt, but they are not exogenous to the political process. Rather, they
are products of the interaction between the voters and the leaders, an
interaction that creates new desires through education as well as
through manipulation. Even when the voters have direct, material in-
terests, there may be no simple way for them to grasp the relevant is-
sues on their own. For example, nothing affects people more than a
financial panic, but the possible mechanisms for eliminating those
disagreeable events are unknown to the public until political leaders
make them an issue.
To be sure, the means by which contemporary politicians com-
municate with the public may seem more manipulative than educa-
tive. Television, in particular, has been criticized for its debased
commercialism and its sound-bite sensibility. Once again, however,
'. EDEL UMN, CONSTRUCTING, supra note 73, at 120-21.
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we must be sure that unconscious attitudes do not distort our judg-
ments. The eighteenth century coffee houses, which Habermas offers
as the model for intelligent political debate were attended only by a
small segment of the population and may be as irrelevant to us as an-
cient Athens. In modem society, we not only have television, but also
talk radio, newspapers and magazines, the internet, and the most ex-
tensive educational system in the history of the world. Even televi-
sion's cheap commercialism, although deeply offensive to intellectu-
als, is not necessarily an evil; premodern politicians were undoubtedly
more grand and dignified, but their very grandeur could serve as the
mechanism for manipulation. Monarchic or aristocratic leaders who
appear before the populace clothed in the regalia of a God-ordained
regime, accompanied by the graceful majesty of exquisitely decorated
palaces and a family tradition reaching back into the mythic past, are
not exactly opening themselves to public criticism. In contrast, the
aesthetic ruin that the modem world has visited upon its leaders com-
pels them to leave their palaces, strip off their finery, and crawl
through the commercialized dust to beg ordinary people for their
votes. That may be uncouth, but it is probably a better means of
avoiding oppression and securing liberty than any nostalgia-driven
opposition to expertise, specialization, or policy elites.
C. Pluralism and Public Choice
A third theory of democracy is pluralism. It also comes in two dif-
ferent versions, but unlike elite theory, these versions emerge from
different academic methodologies and involve different normative as-
sociations. The first version, which can be called polyarchic plural-
ism,*s is grounded in political science and considers its findings a
source of optimism about government. The second version, public
choice, is grounded in microeconomics and considers its findings a
source of pessimism. Despite these differences, both versions share
the empirical assessment that the economy and civil society are com-
posed of a multiplicity of organizations. Some organizations have no
87 JORGEN HABERIMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFOR1MATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE
32-34 (Thomas Burger trans., 1989).
88 The phrase is taken from Robert A. Dahl, who is the leading exponent of this
theory. See ROBERTA. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1-32 (197 1)
[hereinafter DAHL, POLYARCHY] (examining the circumstances that increase the
chances of public contestation and polyarchy); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 63-89 (1956) [hereinafter DAHL, PREFACE] (examining pol)ar-
chal democracy).
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political program, some include a political program among a variety
of functions, and some are organized for predominantly political pur-
poses. Politically active organizations interact with government in dif-
ferent ways: they campaign for particular candidates during elections;
they lobby the legislature, the chief executive, and the administrative
agencies; they negotiate with these various governmental units; and
they appeal to one governmental unit against the other.
The pluralist account is specifically designed as an alternative to
the image of society embodied in both liberal and elite democratic
theory. Against liberal theory, pluralism asserts that the citizenry can-
not be regarded as an undifferentiated mass that governs itself
through the electoral process. As Robert Dahl, James Buchanan, and
Gordon Tullock point out, elections do not effectively aggregate indi-
vidual preferences. Even if they could, they occur only intermittently
and do not address the full range of political issues. Thus, people
must express their preferences by contributing and campaigning dur-
ing elections and by communicating in various other ways ith gov-
ernment officials during the relatively long intervals between elec-
tions. Usually, all this activity occurs through the medium of
organizations. Therefore, organizations, not the electorate in general,
exercise control over the government.
Against elite theory, pluralism asserts the multiplicity of organiza-
tions and their varied strategies for exercising influence. Dahl and
Nelson Polsby have shown, through careful empirical work, that most
American governments are not dominated by a single, independently
defined elite but are controlled by shifting alliances of organizations."°
Mancur Olson points out that the political strength of organizations
often is not attributable to the social status of their members but to
their ability to mobilize resources and votes.9'
Polyarchic pluralism, represented by the work of Dahl, Polsby, and
Daxid Truman,u'  goes beyond these important, widely accepted obser-
Sv JANIES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TuLLocK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LocICAL FoUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 119-231 (1962) (analyzing
decisionmaking rules and the majority rule model); DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 88, at
34-62 (discussing the characteristics of populist democracy).
Si ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOvERNs? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN
CITV 186-220 (1961) (considering patterns of integration and coalitions); NELSON W.
POLSBY, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY 112-21 (1963) (examining the
pluralist approach in the study of community power).
S ,1 %L"NCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECrTVE ACTION 43-52 (1965).
For a more detailed description of polyarchic pluralism, see DAHL, POLYARCHY,
%l, note 88; DA-HL, PREFACE, supra note 88; POLSBY, supra note 90; DAVID B. TRUMAN,
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vations and advances the further claim that the patterns it has dis-
cerned constitute a theory of democracy. This claim is based on the
contention that all political interests in society, or perhaps the primary
political interests of all members of society, are reflected in the or-
ganizations that vie for political control. In addition, these groups will
exert sufficient force to balance out each other, so that each group
will secure at least minimal recognition of its members' interests, but
no group will become dominant enough to take control of the state
and tyrannize society. Dahl traces this conception of democracy back
to Madison and Hamilton, and describes it as the rule of the minori-
ties, rather than the rule of the majority. 93
As critics have regularly observed, this homeostatic account of
pluralism's operation is empirically implausible. To begin with, it
does not ensure that all interests will be recognized."1 Some indidu-
als may not find their interests represented by any politically active or-
ganization, or the organization that represents them might be system-
atically excluded from the governmental process by a majority that
defines itself as "us" and the excluded group as "other. ' 5 As a result,
the oppression of racial minorities, religious minorities, linguistic mi-
norities, or any other readily identifiable subgroup threatens the val-
ues of fairness and liberty. The lugubrious history of African-
Americans in the United States is an extreme example, but a continu-
ally instructive one. In addition, it is possible for stable coalitions of
THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951).
93 See DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 88, at 4-33.
94 See ELY, supra note 1, at 135 (noting that pluralism has come under powerful at-
tack as more stress is placed on concentrations of power and inequalities among politi-
cal groups); HELD, supra note 52, at 186-220 (discussing the criticisms of pluralism);
JACK LIVELY, DEMOCRACY 131-45 (1975) (examining participation as an end of democ-
racy); STEVEN LUKEs, POwER: A RADICAL VIEw 16-35 (1974) (questioning the limits or
bias of pluralism); CLAUS OFFE, DISORGANIZED CAPITALISM 259-99 (1985) (examining
majority rule and its shortcomings); Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of
Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 947, 948 (1962) (stating that pluralism provides no objec-
tive criteria for distinguishing between important and unimportant issues in the politi-
cal arena). Another body of criticism suggests that organizations do not necessarily
represent the interests of their members, rather, organizations may reflect little more
than the interests of those who organized them. For a more detailed discussion of this
criticism, see MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY. PERSPECTIVES ON
PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM (1986); TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF
INTERESTS: INCENTIVES AND THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS
(1980); Michael T. Hayes, The New Group Universe, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 133
(AllanJ. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 2d ed. 1986); Terry M. Moe, Toward a Broader
View of Interest Groups, 43J. POL. 531 (1981).
9, See ELY, supra note 1. See generally William Lee Miller, Some Underpinnings of
American Constitutional Democracy, in DEMOCRACY: ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 61
(W. Lawson Taitte ed., 1988) (citing examples of failures of the Constitution).
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allied organizations to dominate the government and oppress large
numbers of the populace, perhaps even the majority. This may seem
unlikely in a nation such as the United States, where civil society is so
diffuse, government is relatively decentralized, and cultural traditions
are measured in mere decades, but it is a palpable threat in more set-
tled cultures such as France, Britain, and Japan, as well as in third
world electoral regimes with a large uneducated underclass, such as
Mexico, Brazil, or India. While elite theory cannot sustain its strong
claims that society is dominated by a narrow group, a stable coalition
of wealthy or prestigious organizations might achieve such dominance
for long periods of time. Similarly, the agenda control described by
Lukes and Bachrach and Baratzi 6 might serve as a means of foreclos-
ing the populace from raising certain issues.
Although the inaccuracies of pluralism are sometimes ascribed to
1950s complacency, the tone of major works in this tradition does not
seem particularly smug. What these works reveal is a commitment to
democracy, and perhaps it was this commitment that led them to
overstate their case. Dahl's working definition of democracy is a pro-
cess "by which ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of con-
trol over leaders," *7 and his more elaborate definition of polyarchy
specifies the manner in which such control is exercised by individu-
als."' Clearly, this concept is not entirely congruent with his empirical
description of the United States as being ruled by the interplay among
organizations. The disjunction might have been resolved by stating
that these organizations represent the interests of many but not all the
citizens, thereby implementing a weaker, second order citizen control
over the government. But this was not enough for Dahl; he was using
the term "democracy," and that suggested to him that the people
should rule themselves and play an active role in governance. Dahi
and other polyarchic pluralists therefore declared that political or-
ganizations represent the interests of all ordinary citizens and imple-
ment comprehensive citizen control over the state. In other words,
the term "democracy" implied direct democracy, and this concept
then affected the description of modern government that Dahl pro-
posed.
.... S'e Bachrach & Baratz, supra note 94, at 949 (stating that an individual or group
could limit decisionmaking to noncontroversial matters by influencing community
values and political rituals). But see LuKEs, supra note 94, at 21-25 (considering the
agenda control anal)sis a major advance but still finding it inadequate).
DAI-IL, PREFACE, supra note 88, at 3.
Sre id. at 84-89 (giving a detailed definition of polyarchy).
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In some sense, the polyarchic pluralists described America as the
modern equivalent of Athens, with organizations occupying the place
of idealized Athenian citizens. Like these idealized citizens, organiza-
tions are fully informed, participate enthusiastically in governance,
and exist in relatively small, manageable numbers. They do not
gather in an assembly, to be sure, but the shifting alliances that Dahl
and Polsby found enable all of them to rule and to be ruled in turn.
This carries the delicious implication that the administrative appara-
tus is epiphenomenal, a reflection of the collaboration among the
meta-citizens who constitute the real essence of our government.
Public choice, the pessimistic, microeconomically inspired strand
of pluralist theory, begins from the premise that all individuals are try-
ing to maximize their material self-interest. Since the self-interest of
elected politicians lies in retaining their positions, their primary moti-
vation is to maximize their chance of re-election. By itself, this claim
is neither particularly pessimistic nor particularly microeconomic; one
standard account of representative government is that the representa-
tives should strive to reflect the wishes of their constituents. When
this approach is combined with a pluralist view of the general popu-
lace, however, it leads to the conclusion that the elected officials
maximize their chance of re-election by reflecting the wishes of politi-
cally active organizations, rather than the wishes of ordinary citizens.
The microeconomic analysis of organizations then adds a further
complication. Since all people are motivated to maximize their mate-
rial self-interest, they will only contribute their effort and money to a
political organization designed to obtain legislation or executive deci-
sions that satisfy those interests. Worse still, since government action
cannot be directed toward contributors only, but must apply to an en-
tire category, individuals will conclude that they can increase their
material advantages still further if they avoid contributing entirely,
and "free ride" on the efforts of others. Because each person will
reach this same conclusion, large groups of people with vaguely de-
fined interests, such as consumers, taxpayers, or parents, can never
organize. The groups that coalesce and obtain sufficient resources for
political activity will be those that are sufficiently small and narrowly
focused so that the leadership can police the members and impose a
sanction for failure to contribute. These will be special interest
groups, such as used car dealers, funeral directors, and independent
insurance agents. Viewing the political process as a market, where
voters buy governmental programs with their votes, the organizational
advantages of small, narrowly focused groups constitutes a market
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failure; the result is that the government programs generated by this
defective political market always favor special interest groups and dis-
advantage the unorganized majority."
As a descriptive theory, public choice suffers from grave empirical
defects. Many observers have pointed out that it does not accurately
explain the behavior of voters, who have no personal incentive to vote,
and in any case do not always vote in accordance with their economic
interests.""' Neither does it explain the behavior of legislators, who are
often motivated by ideological considerations." l Most significantly for
present purposes, it fails to explain the development of politically ac-
tive interest groups. The public choice analysis of interest group for-
mation was developed by Mancur Olson in his 1965 book, The Logic of
Collective Action. Soon afterwards, as social movement theorists such as
William Gamson, Ethel Klein, Kristin Luker, Anthony Oberschall, and
Sidney Tarrow have observed," 2 political entrepreneurs were able to
- For summaries of the public choice theory, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAw AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II
(1989); Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing
aud Padirq of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1991). For characteristic works, see
BUtCIIXNAN & TULLOCK, supra note 89; BRUCE CAIN ET AL., THE PERSONAL VOTE:
C0oxSfITUENCY SERVICE AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE (1987); JOHN A. FEREJOHN,
PORK B.URREL POLITICS: RIERS AND HARBORS LEGISLATION, 1947-1968 (1974);
MoRRIs P. F1ORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (2d
ed. 1989); D'AVID R. MTIYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
Sr" ,AVNTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260-76 (1957)
(exploring why it is rational not to vote at all); MUELLER, supra note 99, at 348-69
(1989) (discussing the rational voter paradox); George A. Quattrone & Amos Tversky,
UCusal Vosus Diagnostic Contingencies: On Self-Deception and the Voter's Illusion, 46 J.
PLRSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 237, 244-47 (1984) (describing an experiment involving
the motix ations of voters); Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Rational Citizen Faces Election Day
W lT7tat Rational Choice Theoists Don't Tell You About American Elections, in ELECTIONS AT
HOME AND ABROAD 71 (M. Kent Jennings & Thomas E. Mann eds., 1994) (exploring
real-world obstacles to the rational voter theory). Electoral participation tends to be
more strongly correlated with education and more weakly correlated with age, but not
correlated with any obvious economic indicator. See RAIOND E. WOLFINGER &
STLVENJ. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 23-53 (1980).
S,1,' RICHARD F. FENNO,JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 1-14 (1973) (discuss-
ing the goals of members of committees in the House of Representatives); JOHN W.
KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS 29-223 (3d ed. 1989) (exploring the
tarious factors influencing the voting decisions of congressmen); ARTHUR MAASS,
CONGRESS ,ND THE COMMON GOOD 3-74 (1983) (proposing a framework for the anal)-
sis of congressional decisionmaking); WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., LEGISLATURE 105-57
(1982) (exploring the legislative process in the California state legislature).
Iod For examples of representative works, see WILL IM A. GAMSON, THE STRATEGY
Or SOCLM PROTEST (2d ed. 1990); ETHEL KLEIN, GENDER POLITICS (1984); KRISTIN
Lt'KER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984); ANTHONY
OBERSCHALL, SOCIAL CONFLICT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (1973); SIDNEY TARROw,
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collect resources from large groups with diffuse interests, and began
playing a major role in the issues of the day. These included con-
sumer and environmental activists in the liberal 1960s, and were
joined by anti-abortion and family values activists in the more conser-
vative 1970s and 1980s. 10 3 Not only did these entrepreneurs mobilize
significant resources, but they often did so by emphasizing the very
same free rider problem that public choice theorists believed would
doom their efforts. Consumer representatives collected funds from
the middle class to protect low income consumers who lacked the
skills to protect themselves; environmentalists collected funds to pro-
tect politically inactive wolves and eagles; anti-abortionists collected
funds to protect the voiceless, voteless fetus. As it turned out, it was
meaning, not self-interest, that motivated many citizens' participa-
tion.10
The difficulty with this public choice analysis, as a normative the-
ory, is that it is an unexplained comparison. No political mechanism
can reflect the views of citizens with perfect accuracy; thus, global
condemnation of our existing system is convincing only if some de-
monstrably better alternative can be presented. Public choice's ex-
plicit suggestion that the unregulated market constitutes such an al-
ternative has been rejected for at least a century as normatively
unacceptable and politically unsustainable. Everyone recognizes that
the modem administrative state has serious defects, and virtually eve-
ryone recognizes that its absence, in a mass industrial society, is worse;
POWER IN MOVEMENTS (2d ed. 1998).
103 On recent citizen movements, see generally JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1978); TARROW, supra note 102; ALAIN
TOURAINE, RETURN OF THE ACTOR: SOCIAL THEORY IN POST INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
(Myrna Godzich trans., 1988); ALAIN TOURAiNE, THE VOICE AND THE EYE (Alan Duff
trans., 1981). On specific movements, see LUKER, supra note 102 (1984); ANDREW S.
MCFARLAND, PUBLIC INTEREST LOBBIES: DECISION MAKING ON ENERGY (1976); MARK
V. NADEL, THE POLITIcS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION (1971); THOMAs R. ROCHON,
MOBILIZING FOR PEACE: THE ANTINUCLEAR MOVEMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE (1988);
SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVISM
IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT (1991). Of course, these developments should not really
have been a surprise, given the prevalence of mass movements in prior historical eras.
An obvious example, of particular relevance for Americans, is abolition. See LOUIS
FILLER, THE CRUSADE AGAINST SLAvERY, 1830-60 (1960) (describing the American abo-
litionist movement).
104 For descriptions of the extent to which people join interest groups to express
ideological or emotional needs, see, for example, JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL
ORGANIZATIONS 33-40 (1995); Thomas L. Gals &Jack L. Walker, Jr., Pathways to Influ-
ence in American Politics, in MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA: PATRONS,
PROFESSIONS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 103 (Joel D. Aberbach et al. eds., 1991); Hayes,
supra note 94.
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that is why no significant group of voters or leading public officials
ever contemplate abandoning it. The reason public choice scholars
can plausibly advance such a retrograde suggestion is that they are re-
lying on a much less explicit comparison-the comparison between
modem government and the polyarchic pluralists' politeia of organiza-
tions. If one begins with the expectation that interest groups can
serve as Aristotelian citizens, determining policy by their direct par-
ticipation while ruling and being ruled in turn, then the public choice
demonstration that these groups do not accurately represent the peo-
ple's views seems like a fatal criticism. But such a politeia of organiza-
tions is a chimera born of the premodern concept of democracy.
Once this antiquarian ideal is subtracted from the equation, and the
inherent inaccuracy of any political mechanism is recognized, the
normative force of public choice dissolves.
Both polyarchic pluralism and public choice represent a real con-
tibution to the empirical account of government, but their expecta-
tions about the nature of democracy induce them to overstate their
case. Moreover, both assume that democracy, with its embedded but
unexplained Aristotelian features, is an unquestioned good, so that a
government that achieves this vaunted state is worthy of great praise,
while one that fails to do so merits condemnation.
D. Deliberative Democracy
Deliberative democracy is the final theory that will be considered
here. As the most recently developed approach, it incorporates many
of the insights, and responds to many of the problems, that have
emerged from other democratic theories. Its central claim is that de-
mocracy is defined by the existence of a free, inclusive, rational debate
by citizens that determines the basic thrust of public policy. In the
course of this debate, citizens exchange views, persuade or are per-
suaded on the basis of sound reasons, and reach conclusions that rep-
resent a mutually agreed-upon position at the very least, and perhaps
a vision of the common good. Because previous sociological research
suggests that these requirements are rarely met, deliberative theory
tends to be normative in tone.
Leading proponents of this approach include Bruce Ackerman,
John Dryzek, John Ely, James Fishkin, Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson, Jfirgen Habermas, John Rawls, Cass Sunstein, and Joshua
Cohen." ' There is a pronounced overlap between deliberative and
J,- For a complete articulation of each proponent's argument, see BRUCE A.
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participatory theories because the two perspectives are mutually sup-
porting. Very roughly, participatory democracy focuses on the quan-
tity of citizen involvement, while deliberative democracy focuses on its
quality. To meet the participatory standard all citizens must be politi-
cally active, but their involvement need only be sincere, not rational;
to meet the deliberative standard, citizens must engage in rational dis-
cussion of the issues, but many need do nothing more than listen,
talk, and vote. While these positions are distinct, few proponents of
either view would deny the advantages of incorporating the other.
Thus, the benefits of full citizen participation would increase if they
participated rationally, while more widespread participation would
amplify the benefits of rational discussion among citizens. Perhaps
the clearest distinction between the two approaches is that participa-
tory democracy tends to absorb civil society into the political system,
while deliberative democracy recognizes, and even celebrates, the in-
dependent existence of the political realm.
As a description of the contemporary government's relationship
to its citizens, the theory of deliberative democracy displays some dis-
tinct advantages over earlier accounts. It acknowledges that the citi-
zens themselves do not govern, and can even accept the empirical
conclusion of elite theory that government officials constitute a sepa-
rate and identifiable group, if only by virtue of their office. Delibera-
tive democratic theory also acknowledges the pluralist insight that citi-
zens are often organized in political, social, or religious groups and
that much of their politically oriented activity occurs within such
groups. In addition, it opens an inquiry into the process of social in-
terchange, opinion formation, and conceptual development among
ordinary citizens that other theories of democracy tend to disparage
or ignore.
Because it is characterized as a theory of democracy, however, the
deliberative approach has been enticed by the meanings embedded in
ACKER iAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); JOHN S. DRYZEK
DISCURSIvE DEMOCRACY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (1990); ELY, supra
note 1; JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY XND
DISAGREEMENT (1996);JtRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg
trans., 1996); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
PARTIAL CONSITUTION (1993);Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Denocratic Legitimacy, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 67 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997). In legal
scholarship, this approach overlaps to a considerable extent ith the civic republican
movement. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra; Michelman, supra note 64, at 17-36 (discussing
the civic republican movement in the context of a contemporary Supreme Court
term).
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the term into two empirically implausible assertions. To begin with,
the basic concept of deliberation must be recognized as a metaphor
when applied to the political realm. It describes an intensive pattern
of statement, response, and counter-response, where the speakers are
in direct contact of some sort and can answer or accept each others'
arguments. This undoubtedly occurs among individuals and within
certain organizations, but can it really be said to occur within civil so-
ciety at large? In a modem state, particularly an administrative state
with its hundreds of operational agencies, citizens and citizen groups
are more likely to be engaged in intensive interactions with a particu-
lar agency than they are with each other. Bankers, factory managers,
and large-scale farmers do not interact with members of the other
groups very much, but they may talk to their own regulatory agencies
more often than they talk to anyone outside their immediate families
and colleagues.
The metaphor of deliberation among the members of civil society
in general seems inspired by an ancient Greek assembly, where all the
citizens meet to debate and decide "all causes, or at any rate.., the
most important."l'J  No one would take such an image seriously these
days, but descriptions of the citizenry, or civil society, as a single entity
implicitly invoke that image. The motivation for invoking it is the be-
lief that such descriptions are somehow necessary for a democratic
polity; the cost of indulging in this enticing metaphor, however, is that
one underemphasizes or ignores the more subtle gradations of con-
temporary politics."" Examples of public deliberation include: the
way political parties operate; the way existing organizations in civil so-
ciety formulate political positions; the way new groups coalesce to rep-
resent previously unexpressed or nonexistent views; the way these
groups communicate with potential recruits, governmental agencies,
and each other; and the way national media adopt their approaches
and are differently understood or appreciated by these different
groups. The image of civil society as a whole deliberating about some
issue is an unproductive metaphor driven by the premodem image of
democracy.
The second implausible assumption of deliberative theory is that
t, ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at 240.
Se, r.g., Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic
hlirtun Riforins of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1567 (1988) (contrasting civic
irtue and the political party approach); Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic
Ropubliranisi, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 801 (1993) (criticizing modem civic republicanism as
inconsistent uith the kind and level of protection of civil liberties favored by liberals).
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public deliberation must be rational. Contemporary political debate
obviously fails to achieve this standard, something one can readily
confirm by spending a few minutes listening to political talk radio. It
is easy enough for people, especially those with secure, middle or up-
per middle class jobs that depend on rational thought, to condemn
this widespread irrationality as a character deficit. But the idea that
political issues have consensus solutions that can be perceived by rea-
son is another outmoded notion of premodern origin. Modern social
science teaches us that people in a given society often have genuinely
incompatible views, based on both their interests and their ideology,
that these views are generated by, and generate, intense emotional re-
sponses, and that the resulting conflicts are resolved by compromise
or suppression, rather than persuasion.'"8 This does not mean that
citizens are incapable of reasoned argument, nor even that reason
cannot triumph over emotions under certain circumstances. The
point, rather, is that reason operates in particular regions of political
discourse, and that interest or emotions prevail in others."
If one wants to hear interchanges that approximate the delibera-
tive ideal of rationality one need only turn the radio dial from the po-
litical talk show to the sports talk show. There, instead of people
shouting, insulting, and interrupting each other, one will find knowl-
edgeable fans debating complex issues in a coherent, often thoughtful
manner. An absence of emotional involvement is not the reason why
the discourse on the sports program is so much more rational. People
care passionately about sports; as Antonio R. Damasio points out, they
could not sustain their interest if they did not care."" But it is rela-
tively easy for them to separate their emotional involvement with their
team from their intellectual assessment of its merits. To begin with,
the very meaning of sports is that the contestants are roughly matched
in ability, so that each team wins some games and loses others. Seeing
108 See Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: So-
cial Choice Theory, Value Pluralism and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2121 (1990)
(criticizing rational choice theory).
109 See Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theorl and
the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 329 (1994) (describing
how Aristotle's view of political behavior incorporated emotive values as well as ration-
ality, and thus conflicts with deliberative democracy's emphasis on rationality). Aris-
totle believed, however, that people could reach agreement on political issues; his con-
cept of virtue does incorporate certain emotive elements, but he did not see them as
having the subjective quality we now associate with emotion. See ALASDAIR MACIN'1RE,
AFrERVIRTUE 145-64 (2d ed. 1984).
110 ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE
HUMAN BRAIN (1994).
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one's team lose may be disappointing, but it does not challenge either
the validity of one's commitment to that team or one's confidence in
the fairness of the general enterprise. In addition, winning and losing
are unambiguous, and fans evaluate the individual performances that
contribute to these results according to a set of internally defined cri-
teria such as home runs, batting average, and runs batted in. Finally,
the results of a sports event have no material effect on the lives of fans;
it is sad to see one's team lose, but it does not reduce one's salary, en-
danger one's liberty, or decrease the opportunities available to one's
children. These features will never apply to politics. As long as peo-
ple perceive the meaning of politics as a search for optimal answers, as
long as there are no fixed criteria for evaluating political outcomes or
individual performances, and as long as politics affects people's per-
sonal lives, emotionalism will drench the entire enterprise.
We need not despair, however, about the inextricably emotional
character of the political realm. The whole point of a representative,
electoral regime is to translate people's intensely felt political beliefs
into an orderly, responsive, governmental process. The virtue of our
modern governmental system is not that it displaces people's emo-
tions with rationality, but that it displaces people's natural responses
to those emotions, which is to kill each other, with an orderly gov-
ernmental process. Fortunately for us, this does not demand that the
citizens possess virtue, but only that they abjure egregious vices.
In his recent book, Between Facts and Norms, Habermas tries to re-
solve these two implausibilities of deliberative democratic theory.'
He previously argued that the rationalization of Western conscious-
ness enables us to achieve the emancipatory possibilities inherent in
human language. In a rationally, as opposed to a traditionally, or-
dered world, we might interact with other human beings by means of
communicative action, which is speech directed toward reaching mu-
tual understanding, rather than through strategic action, which is
speech designed to achieve the speaker's private purposes." Thus,
I lABERMAS, supra note 105. For discussions of this important work, see James
Bohman, Complexitv, Pluralism, and the Constitutional State: On Habermas's Faktizitft und
Geltung, 28 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 897 (1994); William E. Forbath, Habermas's Constitution:
A Histon, Guide, and Critique, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 969 (1998); William E. Forbath,
Short-Circuit: A Critique of Habermas's Understanding of Law, Politics, and Economic Life, 17
CRDozo L. RExv. 1441 (1996); Michael Rosenfeld, Law as Discourse: Bridging the Gap
Btween Democray and Rights, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1163 (1995).
U See 1 JORGEN HABEtRMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON
AND THE RATIONAIZATION OF SOCIETiy 273-337 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987)
(1981) (reflecting upon social action, purposive activity, and communication).
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the rationalization of Western society would no longer lead to the pro-
liferation of a morally disconnected, instrumental rationality, as
Weber envisioned, but to a rational discussion of empirical data,
moral positions, and personal emotions, that would abolish oppres-
sion, enabling individuals to reach their full potential. '" In other
words, we would break out of Weber's iron cage. What prevents us
from doing so is the colonization of the lifeworld by the steering
mechanisms of money and power." 4 These place the forces operating
on individuals outside of their personal control and comprehension,
thus limiting the emancipatory possibilities of communicative action.
Deliberative democracy is a solution to this problem, in Haber-
mas's view, because it institutionalizes communicative action. The col-
lective opinion and will formation that occurs within civil society be-
comes the steering mechanism for the government, and for the
economic system it controls."5 As a result, the lifeworld of the indi-
vidual regains the dominance it possessed in traditional society, but it
is now a rationalized lifeworld that contains the possibility of emanci-
pation-a possibility that can be realized through the interaction be-
tween civil society and the political system. In a metaphor derived
from Bernard Peters, Habermas envisions political institutions such as
the legislature in the center of society, the administrative agencies sur-
rounding it in a concentric ring, and civil society surrounding the en-
tire government as a second concentric ring."6 The mechanisms of
representative government constitute channels or "sluices" by which
the opinions formed in civil society can be communicated to the po-
litical institutions at the center. Communicative action enables civil
society to generate, or constitute, a "public sphere," which autono-
mously produces opinions and decisions that influence the political
system through these structurally established channels.' 17
Habermas's theory of modern government is an impressive one,
113 See id. at 243-71 (discussing Weber's theory of rationalization); see also 2
HABEIMAS, supra note 75, at 301403 (discussing possibilities for rationalization in
modem society).
114 See 1 HABERMAS, supra note 112, at 113-97 (discussing the relationship between
system and lifeworld). For a discussion of the relationship between this aspect of
Habermas's thought and elite theory's analysis of voters, see 2 HABERMLxs, supra note
75.
, SeeHABERMAS, supra note 105, at 287-328.
16 See id. at 354-58. The book to which Habermas refers is BERNARD PETERS, DIE
INTEGRATION MODERNER GESELLSCHAFTEN (1993), which is not available in an English
translation. The critique advanced in the text, therefore, is a critique of Habermas's
use of Peters's book, not of Peters.
17 See RAERMIAS, supra note 105, at 329-87.
GET-TING PAST DEMOCRACY
and it certainly builds on the capacity of deliberative democratic the-
ory to explain the intersection between civil society and government.
But it does not really resolve the descriptive implausibilities of delib-
erative democracy. Neither a shared ordinary language, grounded in
the lifeworld, nor a set of overlapping mechanisms for communicating
information, are sufficient to transform civil society or its public
sphere into a unified, functional entity; the Aristotelian image of an
assembly is still distorting the description of the citizenry's actions. In
any society there will be generally held views, but those views typically
will be expressed by particularized interactions between citizens and
government, not in any form of collective expression that reflects the
beliefs of the citizenry as a whole. Habermas's metaphor supports this
contention rather than his own; if civil society is a second concentric
ring surrounding the administrative apparatus, then each portion of
that society will be significantly closer to some portion of the adminis-
trative apparatus than to most other portions of civil society in gen-
eral. The idea that the individuals in that widely dispersed outer ring
will communicate intensively enough to generate mutually held views
and then force those views down narrow sluices, bypassing the adja-
cent agencies, does not plausibly describe either the image or the em-
pirical data about political behavior.
Nor does Habermas resolve the descriptive difficulties with delib-
erative theory's assertions about the necessary rationality of citizens.
Like Aristotle,"' he argues that the inherent nature of language dem-
onstrates that language, when used rationally, or communicatively,
provides a means of reaching understanding capable of generating
political consensus."* But Habermas's own need to ground his eman-
cipatory theory in a real-world, institutional context drives his claim
that the citizenry is capable of dealing with political issues through
communicative action; he fails to explain why people would not use
language instrumentally, why they will not continue to treat each
other as opponents, and why they will not continue to assess political
issues in emotional terms. At most, he claims that, "the lifeworld
can ... reproduce itself only through communicative action. " 2" Even
Stt'ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at 28-29 ("[Ughereas mere sound is but an indica-
tion of pleasure and pain, and is therefore found in other animals .... the power of
speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and likewise the just
and the unjust.").
I", Sir -LBERNAMS, supra note 105, at 315-28 (discussing the sociological translation
of the concept of deliberative politics); I HABERMAS, supra note 112, at 273-337 (dis-
cussing language as a means of understanding).
1_I-LBERMLNS, supra note 105, at 324; see also id. at 55-56, 352-59; JORGEN
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assuming that such a process must occur, the claim seems unconvinc-
ing. The lifeworld, as the totality of felt experience, contains a variety
of emotive, symbolic, and strategic elements; these seem as capable of
generating new structures of consciousness as communicative action.
In fact, it is difficult to see why rationality, or communicative action, is
necessary for any of the political roles that Habermas assigns to civil
society other than the role of implementing Habermas's theory.
One could argue that deliberative democracy is primarily a nor-
mative, rather than a descriptive, theory, and that its descriptive im-
plausibilities should not detract from its aspirational appeal. But the
normative assertions that the concept of democracy produces seem as
questionable as its descriptive claims. The idea that civil society
should be independent from the government, generating an autono-
mous discourse and autonomous opinions, seems attractive only until
one contemplates the correlative possibility that the government
might then be equally independent from civil society. Given the mo-
nopoly of physical force that most modem governments possess, such
a situation poses significant dangers for our value of liberty. One of
the main reasons why government officials in Western nations do not
deploy force against civil society is that they are interconnected with
that society and feel as much sympathy with some people or groups in
that society as they do with many of their fellow officials. More gener-
ally, the sluices in Habermas's metaphor seem dangerously narrow
and too easily closed off or clogged. A continuous interaction be-
tween civil society and government-a porous boundary between the
two that allows a constant, high volume flow of information-is more
likely to protect the substantive value of liberty, to encourage fairness,
and perhaps even to produce efficiency.
With respect to rationality, two observations are worth noting.
First, reason may be the best approach for professional academics, but
it is a somewhat peculiar stance for ordinary people in a political envi-
ronment. People tend to have strong feelings about politics; those in-
dividuals who can set these feelings aside and address questions about
the environment, civil rights, the distribution of wealth, and interna-
tional relations in purely rational terms may end up being somewhat
more bizarre than we envision. Second, Aristotle's belief that reason
would lead all people to the same basic conclusions about political is-
sues is not one that most people share today. Given the possibility of
different outcomes, an unconditional reliance upon reason may be a
dangerous strategy. Conflicts among people who all believe, perhaps
HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRIsIs 47-75 (1975).
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rightly, that they have reached their differing conclusions on the basis
of reason may be difficult to resolve in an amicable manner. We may
well end up with a more effective, fair, and efficient government if
people feel a pre-rational, emotionally based commitment to com-
promise and act agreeably. One would not want to be agreeable to
Nazis, of course; then again, people who are committed to being
agreeable probably would not become Nazis in the first place.
III. ELECTORAL INTERACTION
The term "democracy," with its embedded implications, has mis-
led us, distorting our account of the way modern government relates
to its citizens. If we want to explain this process, it is preferable to set
aside, or bracket, the term, disconnecting its claim to provide an accu-
rate description of the system that we presently possess or to establish
an emotionally satisfying and cognitively useful norm. We should
then seek an alternative account that will describe our actual govern-
ment in a more recognizable way and correspond to our genuine
commitments more closely.
A. A Microanalysis of Elections
Microanalysis offers a way to develop such an alternative account
of our system. This methodology, drawn from transaction cost eco-
nomics, begins from the premise that the actions of individual human
beings create social systems. It does not assume that human beings
are rational or motivated exclusively by material self-interest, as does
Chicago School economics. People can have emotional or ideological
motivations as well, but these motivations must be exclusively their
own, as individuals, not a product of the general will or of the
autonomous behavior of institutions. Microanalysis attempts to de-
scribe the way that the actions of these independently motivated indi-
viduals create social systems by tracing the way individual actions ag-
gregate to produce larger structures. It consciously avoids relying on
generalizations, conceptualizations, or metaphors, and resists the
natural tendency to invoke them as explanatory mechanisms. For ex-
ample, it abjures explaining governmental action as the result of the
balance between different branches of government: what precisely is
a "branch" of government and how do these branches "balance" one
another? From the perspective of microanalysis, the question is what
actions by identifiable human beings result in the observed govern-
mental actions. Of course, it is impossible to eliminate all metaphors
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and conceptualizations; the aspiration is to minimize their use and be
vigilant against the tendency to rely on them in preference to more
concrete explanations.''
The term "democracy" is used to describe the government's rela-
tionship to its citizens, or at least certain aspects of that relationship.
A microanalysis of this subject would focus on the particular interac-
tions between human beings that define that relationship. One such
interaction, or set of interactions, is the process of voting or elections.
Elections have always been regarded as a necessary condition for de-
mocracy; they sustain the claim of self-government and provide the
primary medium for citizen participation.2 Their distortion is the
central theme of elite theory, 123 their validation through the participa-
tion of organized groups defines polyarchic pluralism, and their dis-
tortion by these groups is critical to public choice. 24 Elections are the
primary subject of the deliberation upon which deliberative theory
rests and the principal sluices by which communicative action trickles
or gushes into government. 12 In microanalytic terms, however, elec-
tions are simply one particular, albeit very important, type of interac-
tion between the government and the citizenry.
Contrary to the implications of many democratic theories, elec-
tions, when viewed in microanalytic terms, are not a mechanism by
which citizens control the government; citizens do not, as autono-
mously acting individuals, select their leaders in the manner of the
legendary German tribes. 26 Rather, an election is a response from a
defined electorate that is produced by a mechanism established by the
government itself. As we are all painfully aware of after Florida, some
organization within government has authority to specify the time and
place for voting, set up polls, and list the issues for decision. Various
individuals, who are sometimes inside the government and sometimes
outside it, will then campaign for the result they want. The citizens
respond to this mechanism, and the information provided in the
121 For a description of this methodology, see Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Proc-
ess, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393,
1425-29 (1996); Edward L. Rubin, Putting Rational Actors in Their Place: Economics and
Phenomenology, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1705 (1988) [hereinafter Rubin, RationalActors].
122 Seesupra note 52 (citing sources).
23 See supra notes 71-74 (citing sources).
24 See, e.g., DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 88, at 67-71; supra note 99 (citing sources).
25 See HABERMAS, supra note 104, at 287-328, 352-59.
126 TACrrus, Germany and Its Tribes, in COMPLETE WORKS OF TACrrUS 709-16 (Moses
Hadas ed. & Alfred Church & William Brodribb trans., 1942) (recounting a well
known, possibly fictitious account of democracy among German tribes).
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campaign, by going to the polls and casting votes; their votes then
constitute a signal transmitted to the governmental mechanism de-
signed to respond to it. The votes of the citizens must be uncoerced,
and the citizens must have access to sufficient information so that they
understand the basic implications of their votes. These requirements
are simply definitional and not based on any theory about the rela-
tionship of elections to human rights. If coercion causes the citizens
to make a particular choice, then the citizens do not determine the
outcome of the election; rather, the mechanism of coercion deter-
mines the final result. If voters are uninformed, then they are not
really making a choice but are being used as a randomizing mecha-
nism, like the last digit of the pari-mutual handle.
In this microanalysis of the electoral process, the abstract concepts
of the populace, the popular will, and public opinion disappear, since
only an individual or organization can generate an autonomous signal
to the government, and the populace is neither. Elections consist of a
government-generated signal that elicits a responding signal from a
large group of citizens, acting as individuals. This mechanism con-
structs the populace, or more specifically, it constructs a particular
kind of populace by virtue of its operations. Public opinion polls, fo-
cus groups, and mass movements of various kinds construct different
populaces. There are, of course, regularities among the lifeworlds of
the individuals who comprise each structured populace; the structures
and components of civil society will powerfully affect the intersubjec-
tive meanings that individuals experience, as Habermas suggests."7
These phenomena can be analyzed and will yield useful information
about citizens' voting patterns in elections, just as they will yield useful
information about public responses to opinion polls, focus groups,
and grassroots leaders. The pattern, however, is complex-different
people will possess different intersubjective experiences, and the way
these experiences are activated will vary with the mechanism that
regulates their interaction with the government. As Cynthia Farina
points out,' there is no such thing as public opinion in the abstract,
just as there is no assembly-actual, conceptual, or virtual-where the
citizens meet to debate the issues of the day.
'+ -L\BER MLS, supra note 105, at 329-87.
Farina, sipra note 7, at 992. For an empirical critique of the popular will, see
H.B. NLxo, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 87-89 (1960).
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B. The Function of Electoral Interaction
Having described the structure of the electoral process, the next
step in a microanalysis of that process is to describe the role that the
electoral signal plays when it is transmitted to the government. In an
attempt to convince themselves that the historically derived expecta-
tions of self-government can be fulfilled, many observers tend to over-
estimate the significance of elections.2 In fact, the role of elections,
although exceedingly important, is delimited. Their most crucial
function, as Edwin Baker points out,"' is to determine the identity of a
particular category of government officials, generally those who exer-
cise the broadest and most complete authority. In other words, elec-
tions are a mechanism designed to authorize those individuals to ex-
ert policy control over the administrative apparatus.
This mechanism offers a number of distinct advantages over other
methods of selecting top-level officials. To begin with, it represents a
solution to the problem of succession. The threat of a succession cri-
sis hovers over every monarchy because monarchy relies on the ruler's
physical ability to produce an heir. While the succession of subordi-
nate officials can be resolved readily in any governmental hierarchy,
the replacement of the top-ranking policymaking officials is a more
difficult matter. Elections, when fully institutionalized, solve this
problem so decisively that the significance of their achievement can
be easily forgotten. It is truly impressive, for example, that world
powers such as the United States and Britain have not seen a single
drop of blood shed during the past century over the potentially in-
cendiary issue of succession. Of course, elections do not guarantee
this happy outcome; the American Civil War was triggered by the re-
sults of the 1860 election,' 3' and other nations have dissolved into
chaos when powerful groups refused to abide by an election's re-
sults. 32 Elections, however, are one of the best solutions to the prob-
2 See supra notes 122-25 (citing sources).
30 See C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 25-28 (1998) (stating that elections are a form of employment decision).
131 See MAURY KLEIN, DAYS OF DEFIANCE 130 (1997) (describing the post-election
sentiment that the states would be unable to compromise due to the "irrepressible
conflict" between the North and the South); KENNETH M. STAMPP, AN9D THE WAR GNME
6-11 (1950) (describing the pre-election unrest in 1860 that foreshadowed the Civil
War).
132 Obviously, if significant groups in a society will not accept the results of the
election, the problem of succession has not been resolved. The United States has just
finished struggling with its first genuinely disputed election in more than a century.
But the succession was resolved without violence to anything except, in Justice Stev-
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lem of succession so far devised.
A second role of the electoral signal is to solve the problem of
competence. Neither heredity nor random selection provides any
guarantee that a successor will be competent; sadists, sybarites, and
people with incurably bad judgment are just as likely to succeed under
these systems as intelligent and conscientious leaders. Elections, in
contrast, generally incorporate some assessment of the successor's ca-
pabilities. By definition, in any genuine election, the voters are pre-
sented with an uncoerced choice and receive enough information to
understand the nature of that choice. Under these circumstances, the
competence of the successor is likely to be a major factor in determin-
ing the voters' choice.
Another aspect of competence, which elections partially resolve, is
the problem of debilitation. Hereditary regimes are hostages to the
physical body of their ruler. The same is true for electoral regimes if
the leading officials are elected for life, like the Pope or the Holy Ro-
man Emperor. Elections held after a term of years or a loss of confi-
dence do not fully solve the problem because the ruler can fall ill be-
fore the term runs out or the next election can be organized.
Nonetheless, regular elections substantially reduce the likelihood that
this will occur. Candidates must be reasonably healthy when they run
for office and are likely to fulfill their term, or wear out their wel-
comes, with their bodies still intact.
In addition to containing implicit information about the compe-
tence of the individual selected, the results of an election also reveal
the policies that the individual will likely pursue. This provides a par-
tial solution to the endemic problem of governmental unresponsive-
ness by ensuring that the persons selected will pay at least some modi-
cum of attention to the electorate's desires. There are two
interpretations of how this mechanism functions. The first assumes
that the views of the rival candidates are fixed; consequently, the ar-
gument states that the voters' selection of one candidate incorporates
a judgment about that person's policy preferences and competence.
The second assumes that candidates are capable of learning, and ar-
gues that the selection contains information to which the elected offi-
cial might respond.
Elections, however, are not a complete solution to the problem of
nonresponsiveness. The electorate may represent only a portion of
the citizenry, even in a government that we would be willing to de-
en,'s xiew, the coherence of the Supreme Court's Equal Protection doctrine. See Bush
v. Gore, 121 S. CL 525, 541-42 (2000) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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scribe as a democracy. The English property qualification, for exam-
ple, led to the election of representatives who were singularly unre-
sponsive to the poor,'33 while American racial exclusions produced
similarly predictable results.TM  There are, in addition, the familiar in-
accuracies and distortions of the electoral process that favor the views
of the wealthy, the well organized, and the vociferous. Nevertheless,
the use of the electoral mechanism for selecting leaders does provide
at least some likelihood that the leaders will be responsive to the views
of their constituents.
Elections thus provide imperfect, but adequate, solutions to the
problems of succession, competence, and nonresponsiveness.
Though subject to the inevitable qualifications that attend any hu-
manly designed device, these advantages are considerable-they argue
strongly for the value of elections in achieving our commitments to
security, prosperity, and liberty. That is, however, all that can be
achieved by this particular mechanism. Elections do not enable the
citizenry to govern the country, do not provide personal fulfillment
through political participation, do not ensure that government will be
responsive to organizations representing all sectors of the population,
and do not generate collective deliberation within civil society. Most
of all, elections do not transform the dispersed, vaguely disaffected
citizens of a modern administrative state into a decisionmaking as-
sembly, or allow them to rule and be ruled in turn.
The limited nature of the electoral mechanism that microanalysis
reveals brings us back, once more, to the inevitable reality of the ad-
ministrative state. The factors that preclude the electoral mechanism
from effecting any significant transformation of the administrative
state are inherent. Ordinary citizens can vote for only a small number
of government positions. Perhaps that number is as high as five or six
or as low as one or two. Perhaps it depends upon the number of can-
didates who are competing, the education level of the voters, or the
intensity of political controversy at the time. But the limit is real:
elections can be used only to select a few officials who necessarily will
interpret their role in political terms and who can govern only by issu-
ing broadly defined assignments to the administrative apparatus. Citi-
zens simply will not, and perhaps cannot, absorb the information nec-
133 See E.J. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF REVOLUTION: 1789-1848, at 142-62 (1962) (de-
scribing the discontent of English lower classes and their efforts to obtain increased
representation).
13 See generally ELY, supra note 1, at 77-104 (stating that underrepresentation of
groups produces defects in the democratic process).
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essary to elect the hundreds of currently appointed officials who con-
stitute the leadership of the administrative state. Of course, it would
be possible to include candidates for these positions on a ballot, but
this would only increase the bewilderment that most Americans expe-
rience when confronting a ballot that already lists candidates for city
council, local school board, state judiciary, municipal water district,
and a variety of other institutions about which they have never
thought. As previously stated, an election is real only if the citizens
possess the information necessary for them to make a real choice;
otherwise, the choice is made for them by a political party or some
other entity.'" To list candidates for more than a few positions when
citizens cannot possibly evaluate those candidates, or even recognize
them, is just as artificial as coercing people's votes. While it is cer-
tainly more benign than the coercion employed in the former Soviet
Union, it springs from a similar capacity for self-delusion.
The same is true for referenda, where citizens decide specific is-
sues that otherwise are resolved by legislative or administrative action.
Such referenda have become common in several American jurisdic-
tions, most notably California. ' The narrow-minded selfishness that
referenda results reveal is disconcerting to many observers who were
willing to confer some normative priority on direct expressions of the
voters' views. As a result, a scholarly literature has developed to re-
count the deficiencies and inaccuracies of these referenda-that they
are subject to the same interest group pressures that operate in elec-
tions for representatives and that they add the further difficulty of ask-
ing voters to understand complex, abstract issues rather than more
comprehensible choices between rival human beings. 7 These are
Se supra text accompanying note 110 (evaluating deliberative democracy and
stating that the "virtue of our modem governmental system is not that it displaces peo-
ple's emotions with rationality, but that it displaces people's natural responses to those
emotions... ith an orderly government process").
1'" Se CRONIN, supra note 27, at 38-59 (describing the history of the direct democ-
racy movement and demonstrating how extensive that movement has become);
MGLEBY, snpa note 27; SCHMIDT, supra note 27 (discussing the popularity of ballot
initiatixes from the 1960s to the 1980s).
1.7 For examples of current literature examining the deficiencies of referenda, see
N\LGLEBV,; supra note 27; CGSs R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TME: JUDICIAL
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 132-35 (1999); Derrick A. Bell Jr., The Referen-
dun: Donmocratys Barrier to RacialEquality, 54 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1978); Philip P. Frickey,
Intipretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct Democray, 1996 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 477; Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Gov-
,rumnnt Law. 86 MicH. L. REV. 930 (1988); Hans A. Linde, 1Wen Initiative Lawmaking Is
Not Rlvpubliran Government": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OREGON L. REv.
19 ( 1993); Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent"." Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct
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useful points, but the underlying sense of surprise or dismay is mis-
placed. A referendum, like an election, is simply a mechanism by
which citizens interact with the government. Like any mechanism, a
referendum possesses both virtues and defects, but it cannot be re-
garded as a direct conduit to some mystical source of political justifi-
cation or a means to replace the administrative state with a participa-
tory or deliberative one.
Prescriptions for improving the electoral mechanism provide fur-
ther insight into its functions in an administrative state. While pro-
posals to expand the range of governmental actions that elections de-
termine often reflect the outmoded quest for direct democracy,
proposals to improve the electoral mechanism itself are more realistic.
For example, as long as voter participation levels remain relatively
low,1" ' elected officials will not be responsive to those segments of the
population who do not participate-generally, the poor, the marginal-
ized, and the disaffected.'" The National Voter Registration Act, the
"Motor Voter" Law, addressed this problem in part by facilitating voter
registration. 14 Additionally, the recent use of the internet in the Ari-
zona primary highlights another possible mechanism to facilitate the
process of voting itself. There was no need to wait for such path-
Democracy, 105 YALE LJ. 107 (1995).
138 See RUY A. TEIXEIRA, THE DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER 8, tbl.1-2 (1992)
(showing voter turnout rates in the United States to be considerably lower than in
most other democracies); G. Bingham Powell,Jr., American Voter Turnout in Comparative
Perspective, in CONTROVERSIES IN VOTING BEHAVIOR 56, 78 (Richard G. Niemi & Her-
bert F. Weisberg eds., 3d ed. 1993) ("[V]oter turnout in the United States is very low in
comparison with the other democracies.").
139 See FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE
(1988); Lawrence Bobo & Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and
Black Empowerment, in CONTROVERSIES IN VOTING BEHAVIOR, supra, at 39; Rodolfo 0. de
la Garza & Louis DeSipio, Save the Baby, Change the Bathwater, and Scrub the Tub: Latino
Electoral Participation After Seventeen Years of Voting Rights Act Coverage, 71 TEX. L. REv.
1479 (1993).
140 National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 79 (codi-
fied as amended at42 U.S.C. § 19 7 3gg (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
141 The Arizona Democratic primary was held on March 11, 2000. Registered
Democrats could vote for the candidate of their choice on that day in the regular fash-
ion-at physical polling places. In addition, however, internet voting was provided
pursuant to the Democratic Party's contract with a private firm, alternately called Elec-
tion.com and Votation.com, which previously arranged internet elections for organiza-
tions such as the Sierra Club and the Florida Bar Association. See Election.com, Inc.,
Electronic or Traditional Election Services, at http://www.election.com (last visited Oct. 19,
2000) (providing information on internet based election services). The firm provided
remote voting from computer terminals for the four days preceding March 11, 2000.
See generally ELECTIONS IN CYBERSPACE: TOWARD A NEW ERA IN AMERICAN POLITICS
(Anthony Corrado & Charles M. Firestone eds., 1996).
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breaking technology, however, as voting could have been greatly facili-
tated a long time ago had people been allowed to vote by telephone.
If private firms can authenticate a credit card over the telephone and
ship thousand-dollar items on that basis, the government should be
able to authenticate a vote. Our continued dependence on paper bal-
lots and trips to the polling booths is outmoded, and seemingly re-
flects the Aristotelian image of a physical assembly.
A related need is to provide voters with more complete and acces-
sible information about the choices they face. Television debates rep-
resent a good first step, but more needs to be done. Here, again, in-
teractive television or the internet may provide new solutions. None
of this will obviate the fact that modern media, even with an interac-
tive component, can be used only for the structured presentation of
information to a largely passive audience. To make use of new tech-
nological possibilities, we need to wean ourselves from the image of
elections as votes cast at the end of a face-to-face debate, and think of
them more as a mechanism to achieve certain delimited purposes.
Elections also need to be more fairly organized. Fund-raising abil-
it , and personal wealth currently play too large a role.
1 2 Campaign
finance reform is an obvious solution. In the long run, government
funding of major candidates at a level that would render additional
spending otiose is probably the most promising strategy, but restric-
tions on the expenditure of private funds also have value. The Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act of 197114 was a step in this direction. The
Supreme Court, in striking down the expenditure provisions of this
Act in Buckl v. Valeo,"" reached its conclusion by equating the ex-
penditure of money with free speech and then arguing that expendi-
tures may not be restricted in an electoral setting.145 The perspective
presented in this Article underscores Edwin Baker's criticism of this
conclusion."" The Court conceded that free speech is subject to time,
place, and manner restrictions, but argued that "expenditure limita-
tions impose direct quantity restrictions on political communication
I For an in-depth analysis of the influence that campaign finance plays in politics,
see generally DAVID IV. ADAMANY & GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY (1975);
HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS (4th ed. 1992); ALEXANDER HEARD, THE
Costs of DEMOCRACV (1960); FRANKJ. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANcE (1992).
1 Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431
(1994 & Supp. I 1998)).
111 424 U.S. 1 (1975).
I,, Id. at 14-23, 48-50 (holding that "suppressing communication" by restricting
campaign expenditures violates the free speech protections of the First Amendment).
'S, Baker, supra note 130.
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and association."' 17 As Baker points out, this argument analogizes an
election to society and encourages the idea that an election is consti-
tutive of society as a democracy. If, instead, an election is viewed as
one particular mechanism by which the government and the citizens
interact, a different analogy emerges. An election resembles a trial-a
specific, highly structured mechanism by which we implement a par-
ticular function in our system. Fairness demands that both sides in a
civil trial not only be given the opportunity to state their case, but also
that their statements be limited and channeled to create a rough
equality between opposing parties. This equality is not complete, of
course-the side with more money can buy a better lawyer-but it
would be truly odious if one side could buy more time to state its case
or cross-examine the opposing witnesses. Elections present a similar
issue: they are not distillations of a free society, where unrestricted
quantities of speech are deemed desirable. Instead, they are specific
mechanisms by which such a society solves the problems of succession,
competence, and nonresponsiveness. Consequently, placing limits on
the expenditure of funds so that the candidates can state their cases in
a roughly equal manner should be permissible.
C. The Value and Meaning of Electoral Interaction
The foregoing account of electoral interaction's functions may
seem mechanistic, precisely because it avoids resonant terms such as
"democracy" and employs the microanalytic approach of focusing on
specific individual behaviors. But microanalysis, unlike Chicago
School economics, does not adopt a reductionist view of human be-
ings as motivated exclusively by material self-interest. Instead, it allows
for a full range of emotional and ideological motivations, provided
that these motivations are actually experienced by individuals.' In
fact, by avoiding both abstraction and reductionism, microanalysis of-
fers an account that corresponds more closely to our genuine com-
mitments relating to the electoral process, and captures the perceived
meaning of that process more accurately than the concept of democ-
racy.
Our use of the term "democracy" belies our genuine commit-
ments to security, prosperity, and liberty. At present (within the last
147 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 18.
48 SeeRubin, RationalActors, supra note 121, at 1721-26. For the underlying theory,
see ALFRED ScHUTz, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD 45-57 (George
Walsh & Frederick Lehnert trans., 1967).
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century at least), we achieve security and prosperity through the
mechanisms of the administrative state. These mechanisms comprise
our primary means of governance and of addressing many crucial so-
cial issues. The anti-administrative undercurrent in democratic the-
oil-the myth of self-government, the condemnation of elites, the
pluralist praise for competing interest groups, the condemnation of
the government that those competing interest groups disproportion-
ately influence, the image of public deliberation, and the more sub-
terranean concepts of selection by lot and direction by public de-
bate-represents a rejection of the government we actually possess.
Describing the electoral process in microanalytic terms avoids this
anti-administrative implication. In fact, it specifically acknowledges
the administrative nature of the modern state and the use of elections
to select officials who exercise a general control function, rather than
actually governing the state. This is not to suggest that our existing
government is unassailable. We certainly can improve our govern-
mental system, perhaps by regulating more, perhaps by regulating
less, and perhaps by regulating differently. But we are committed to
its basic structure and, despite our discontent and disaffection, no one
has suggested seriously that we abandon it.
The term "democracy" is most commonly linked with our com-
mitment to liberty. To some extent, this connection is the result of
purely stipulative definitions. If democracy is defined as a system of
government in which all citizens have the right to speak freely, then
democracies undoubtedly provide freedom of speech. The instinct
behind a usage of this sort is a pre-analytic commitment to the term
democracy itself. The result is an agglutinated discourse that fore-
stalls analysis of the real connection between government structures
and their consequences. If we want to know which governmental
structures secure liberty, it is best to avoid the term democracy, with
its embedded normative associations, and ask directly how such struc-
tures operate. This turns out to be a complex empirical question that
is best answered by using the alternative description of electoral inter-
action. In light of this description, the answer is that such interaction
secures liberty to some extent, by making government somewhat re-
sponsive to the electorate and requiring a certain level of free speech
so that the electorate can make a genuine choice. But as both abstract
analysis and historical experience readily demonstrate, electoral inter-
action does not preclude severe restrictions on liberty. Historical ex-
amples of such severe restrictions include nineteenth century Britain's
rigid class structure, nineteenth century America's enslavement of one
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portion of the population, and both nations' subordination and dis-
enfranchisement of women in that era. To say that these nations were
not democracies is a counterintuitive and counterhistorical use of the
term, but to say that they were seems to undervalue the liberty inter-
ests that they denied.
Microanalysis also enables us to form a more realistic assessment
of the meaning of electoral interaction. Some observers' tendencies
to overestimate the significance of the electoral process stem from the
unrealistic aspirations that the concept of democracy induces; the
countervailing tendencies to overestimate the insignificance of elec-
tions stem from the frustration of those same outmoded aspirations.
The mere fact that elections do not secure self-government, participa-
tion, or deliberation does not mean that they are merely a mindless
selection among competing elites or blind expressions of material self-
interest. Rather, elections are an important part of our governmental
system and, as such, have meaning for both elected officials and the
electorate.1
49
For elected officials, election is a source of status in addition to
their actual authority; it is an indication to these officials that they are
central to the governmental process. In an administrative state, most
public officials are appointed, often by other officials who supervise
them and function as their structural superiors.'50 Elections are used
to determine the identity of officials who have no direct superiors and,
therefore, cannot generally be chosen by the convenient process of
appointment. Elected officials generally are the primary policymakers
in the government, the persons assigned the most extensive authority.
Thus, selection by an electoral process indicates that one enjoys the
prestigious position of having no superior and being responsible for
making the most important decisions.
Beyond the status issue, popular election places the official in an
interesting middle ground between expertise and politics. The usual
account, as conceived by Edmund Burke. and elaborated by Hanna
149 For a recent discussion of this issue, see Frank I. Michelman, Brennan and De-
mocraty: The 1996-97 Brennan Center Symposium Lecture, 86 CAL. L. REV. 399 (1998),
which assesses RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996), and ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS:
DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995).
150 See HENRY JACOBY, THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE WORLD 31-35 (Eveline
Kanes trans., 1973) (discussing characteristics of bureaucracies); MAX 'WEBER,
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 212-29 (1968) (analyzing types of authority, including legal
authority with a bureaucratic administrative staff).
151 See BURKE, supra note 19.
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Pitkin, -' is that an elected official-a legislator, paradigmatically-can
either be a conduit, transmitting the views of her constituents, or a
trustee, chosen by her constituents to exercise her own best judg-
ment.'- This formulation, however, seems overly schematic. Empiri-
cal evidence suggests that most legislators construct a meaningful ac-
count of their professional lives by integrating their roles as elected
representative and government official.14 This integration requires
combining a variety of complex inputs from the electorate with an
equal or greater variety of complex inputs from other persons in the
governmental structure. Elected officials tend to view their role as
linked precisely to this process of mediating between two distinctly dif-
ferent sources of influence and information. The officials are able to
do so because they can exercise practical judgment-the pragmatic,
common sense approach that American decisionmakers tend to re-
gard as their essential skill.
For voters, elections also possess a variety of meanings. Perhaps
the most important include the government's duty to serve the pub-
lic's needs and the voters' ability to evaluate and criticize the govern-
ment's performance of that function. These factors may seem to be
rather rudimentary entitlements, far less gaudy than self-government
or popular sovereignty, but this impression derives from the premod-
ern concept that people are capable of self-rule and the superimposed
norm that they are supposed to do so. The administrative state's
norm is that government is an instrumentality for meeting the needs
of its citizens. Thus, the responsiveness that elections help secure is
central to our entire conception of government. Elected officials view
their election as a validation because they share this same instrumen-
tal norm.
A second meaning of elections, as a device for solving the prob-
lems of succession, competence, and nonresponsiveness, is that the
voters are part of the same political system as the government. While
)5Z See Pitkin, supra note 21 (providing an exploration of the theory of political rep-
resentation).
153 See Hamilton, supra note 20, at 558-62 (advocating the attomeyship model).
1'1 For an overview of empirical evidence, see generally JAMES DAVID BARBER, THE
LX %LUKERS: RECRUITMENT AND ADAPTATION TO LEGISLATIVE LIFE (1965);
CHRISTOPHERJ. DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS (3d ed. 1997);
FENNO, supra note 101; KINGDON, supra note 101; ALAASS, supra note 101; MUIR supra
note 101; Edurd L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons From the Truth-in-
Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233 (1991). Public choice scholars generally take issue with
this view and assert that legislators are pure election maximizers. Unlike the sources
cited above, however, they rarely interview actual legislators.
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elections do not transform voters into rulers of the polity, they enable
voters to see themselves as members of it. At the individual level, mak-
ing a choice and casting a vote means that in some sense one is func-
tioning as part of that governmental structure. In addition, voting of-
ten creates an emotional bond between voters and selected
candidates. This bond is important in securing the enthusiasm of
those who favored the ultimate victor, but is even more important in
securing the quiescence of those who favored her opponent. At the
institutional level, any group that participates in the electoral process,
no matter how marginal its origins or radical its political philosophy,
is likely to modify its message to attract more votes or support more
incremental changes that might actually be implemented.' 55 Thus, the
group is likely to organize its efforts around electoral politics to an in-
creasing extent as time progresses. Overall, it will tend to develop an
internal structure that is homologous with mainstream groups, a phe-
nomenon that Paul DiMaggio, Walter Powell, and John Meyer have
described as institutional isomorphism. 1 r6 Elections are thus effective
means of defusing opposition to the government, even more effective
than oppression. Often, this effectiveness is a source of frustration to
those observers who would like to see disadvantaged or marginalized
groups serve as the shock troops of radical change, but the members
of those groups generally decline to play that role once they are in-
volved in an electoral system.
Normative considerations, once again, can extend to these obser-
vations. We tend to regard elections as the expression or natural out-
growth of a profound and mysterious conception of social ordering
known as democracy. At our very worst, as Hannah Arendt points out,
we then treat this conception as the particular creation of the Anglo-
Saxon yolk, sprung from the soil between Kent and Chester, and ca-
pable of transplantation only to new lands where English-speaking
155 See CHARLEs TILLY, THE CONTENTIOUS FRENCH 1-8 (1986) (arguing that mod-
ernization of government and creation of national electoral politics induces citizens to
reconceive their own political activism in national, and often electoral, terms).
156 For a complete description of institutional isomorphism, see PaulJ. DiMaggio &
Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rational-
ity in Organizational Fields, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS 63 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); John Meyer & Brian
Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, in THE
NEw INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra, at 46; John W. Meyer,
Conclusion: Institutionalization and the Rationality of Formal Organizational Structure, in
ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: RITUAL AND RATIONALIT' 261 (John W. Meyer &
W. Richard Scott eds., 1983).
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people have exterminated or suppressed the native population. 
17
Even if we free ourselves from this unattractive mythology, we main-
tain our view that fair elections are part of an elaborate, sophisticated,
somewhat fragile governmental system that can only be implemented,
and perhaps only merited, by a well educated populace that is already
committed to its underlying morality. What our exalted and out-
moded conception of democracy obscures is that elections are a gov-
ernmental mechanism. They neither require nor ensure individual
liberty and social justice, but, if run in a reasonably honest manner,
they can solve the problems of succession, competence, and nonre-
sponsiveness, while binding the government to the welfare of the citi-
zens and the citizens to the stability of the government.
What would have happened had we decided to fight the Cold War
by supporting elections instead of anti-Communism? Effectively, what
we said to the leaders of third world nations, such as El Salvador,
Nicaragua, South Korea, and South Vietnam, whom we regarded as
incapable of establishing our sophisticated mode of democratic gov-
ernance, was: "We will give you money, we will give you armaments,
we will train your security forces to hunt and destroy anyone who re-
bels against your regime, if you will declare yourself an anti-
communist and leave your infant industry and outdated agriculture in
the hands of your entrenched, sybaritic elites." What we might have
said was: "We will give you money if you run fair elections." As recent
events have demonstrated, this turns out to be a rather appealing mes-
sage. Moreover, once elections are institutionalized, they possess
unexpected staying power as a result of the problems they solve and
the commitments they generate. It is impossible to know how such a
strategy would have worked, but, despite its more modest scope, it
would have certainly been more consistent with our own political mo-
rality.
V',7 Spe I-LX\,AH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 175-84 (1951) (discuss-
ing the concept of human rights in terms of British exceptionalism and its attendant
attitudes).I , S,e JOSE MARIA MARAvALL, REGIMES, POLITICS AND MkRKETS:
DEMOCRXIIZATION AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AND EASTERN EUROPE
(Justin Byrne trans., 1997) (examining the political economy of democratization in
southern and eastern Europe); Basilios Tsingos, Underwriting Democracy: The European
Commnunitv and Greece, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF DEMOCRATIZATION:
EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS 315-55 (Laurence Whitehead ed., 1996) (evaluating the
extent to which the European Community has been central to democratization in
eastern Europe by helping to "permanently entrench democratic institutions by offer-
ing an elaborate structure of economic and social incentives").
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IV. ADMINISTRATIVE INTERACTION
If the foregoing discussion seems reductionist, despite its refer-
ences to social meaning, the reason is that it addresses only one aspect
of the electoral process: the signal from the voters to the government.
Traditional theories of democracy generally focus on this same event,
although they tend to treat it as an apotheosis, rather than a signal.
Contemporary political and legal analysis is more sophisticated, how-
ever, and focuses on the multiplicity of interactions that accompany
elections. One such interaction is lobbying by private groups, itself a
complex process that includes threatening, begging and cajoling, tes-
tifying, supplying information, and drafting legislation.1" Other types
of interaction are the various vote-gathering, support-building, and
opposition-blunting activities in which elected officials engage. These
include campaigning, providing information to constituents, negotiat-
ing with interest groups, and casework-that is, intervening with other
parts of government on behalf of influential groups or individuals.
These interactions provide means to amplify some of the advan-
tages of elections by transforming the intermittent signal that elec-
tions provide into a continuous one. Of course, they have no direct
effect on the problems of the succession, competence, or debilitation
of top-level officials. They have important effects on elections' role in
achieving responsiveness, however, and on the social meaning of elec-
tions. The information flow provided by lobbying and interelection
support-building is much more intensive and detailed than that pro-
vided by the election and its attendant campaign.
For citizens, these activities provide additional ways of interacting
with the government beyond casting a vote, and thus give them a
greater sense of connection with the government. Of course, lobby-
ing and support-building activities may favor some groups over others,
and may distort the equality of votes upon which elections are
159 See generally AFTER THE REVOLUTION: PACs, LOBBIES AND THE REPUBLICAN
CONGRESS (Robert Biersack et al. eds., 1999) (analyzing the Republican-controlled
Congress of 1996 and its impact on various lobbying groups); JAMES DEAKIN, THE
LOBBYISTS (1966) (discussing both the attributes and shortcomings of lobbying groups
and their effect on government); MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A
THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS (1981) (defending the importance and influence of
interest groups by analyzing different legislative circumstances); KEN KOLLM.iN,
OUTSIDE LOBBYING: PUBLIC OPINION AND INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES (1998) (ex-
plaining the reasons why, and the occasions when, interest group leaders lobby for
public opinion in addition to their primary objective of lobbying for legislative influ-
ence).
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based.'t  Elections are subject to similar distortions, however, and all
political mechanisms have disadvantages. The point is to understand
the functions that each particular mechanism can potentially fulfill,
ithout resorting to global condemnations based on inherited images
of direct democracy.
A. The Nature of Administrative Interaction
Continuous interaction between private citizens and government
officials is not limited to elected officials. With the advent of the ad-
ministrative state, and the consequent growth of governmental func-
tions at the administrative level, interactions between citizens and
nonelected officials have become equally intensive and significant.
Private groups lobby agencies with equivalent assiduousness: they
threaten, beg and cajole, testify, supply information, and draft regula-
tions just as they do with elected legislators and elected executives.
Conversely, agency officials are often as assiduous as their elected col-
leagues in building support or blunting opposition. Their motivation
is not to gather votes, but to obtain cooperation in program imple-
mentation and avoid appeals from the public to superior authorities.
They do not campaign in the literal sense, but they certainly give
speeches, provide information, negotiate with interest groups, and is-
sue administrative indulgences that are equivalent to casework. One
cannot view these interactions as dependent on elections for their sig-
nificance because administrative officials are not elected. Rather, un-
derstanding their role in modern government requires a new perspec-
tive that is not directly linked to the electoral process.161
Recent scholarship in political science and sociology includes sev-
eral studies containing insightful microanalyses of these interactions
and their contribution to the relationship between citizens and gov-
1-, This is the theme of both progressive critiques of the governmental process.
Sw, e.g., CHLARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC I NTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 239-52 (1913) (suggesting that ratification of the Constitution oc-
curred in part because of constitutionalist interest groups' efforts and not because of
its popularity among either the public or legislators); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH
OF CONSERvATISM 2-10 (1963) (theorizing that the "progressive era" of 1900-1916 is a
misnomer because politicians often based decisions on the solutions proposed by, and
for the benefit of, a select group of powerful businesses); see also supra note 90 (arguing
for a model of shifting coalitions and organizational alliances as the basis of commu-
nity, power).
1 See POST, supra note 149, at 3-10 (suggesting that our standard mode of political
discourse places democracy and administration in separate domains).
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ernment. 1 2 To some extent, however, the continued use of the term
"democracy" distracts even this more sophisticated body of scholar-
ship. Discussion often focuses on whether interaction between citi-
zens and administrative agencies contributes to, or derogates from,
democratic values, with the term "democracy" typically being unde-
fined, treated as an unquestioned good, and inevitably sedimented
with all its premoder implications.13  Once we get past this term,
however, we can avoid these anguished questions and focus on the ac-
tual interaction between citizens and administrative officials. As Peter
Schuck suggests, this interaction possesses a number of structural
162 See GORDON ADAMS, THE POLITICS OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING 165-72 (1982)
(addressing the problem of private members of defense advisory committees and their
self-interested motivations); EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK:
THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982);JOHN E. CHUBB, INTEREST
GROUPS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: THE POLITICS OF ENERGY 18-57 (1983) (suggesting
modem energy politics must be understood in terms of the relative influence of nu-
merous groups contending for protection or promotion by the government); COOK,
supra note 7, at 87-99 (examining government regulations and the processes and fac-
tors effecting them, particularly within the context of interest groups and the Eni-
ronmental Protection Agency); MARTHA DERTHICK, NEW TONS IN-TOWN: WHY A
FEDERAL PROGRAM FAILED 25-102 (1972) (describing seven attempts by the Johnson
Administration to build new communities on federal land, the reasons why the initially
promising projects failed, and the persons and groups responsible for such failures);
MARTHA DERTHICK & PAULJ. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 147-206 (1985)
(crediting Congress for listening to, and heeding, public opinion over the efforts of
lobbyists and industrial interest groups in the deregulation of the airline, telecommu-
nications, and trucking industries); JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON WILDAVSKcy
IMPLEMENTATION 35-69 (3d ed. 1984) (discussing the failed implementation of federal
employment programs in Oakland, California, and the problems of policy implemen-
tation in general).
163 For arguments that administrative interaction contributes to democracy, see
Marshall J. Breger, Government Accountability in the Twenty-First Century, 57 U. PITT. L.
REV. 423 (1996) (suggesting that increased technological opportunities for Congress
to "double-check" regulatory goals will foster a broader range of discretion by bureau-
crats); Frank Fischer, Citizen Participation and the Democratization of Policy Expertise: From
Theoretical Inquiry to Practical Cases, 26 POL'Y SC. 165 (1993) (attempting to demon-
strate that collaborative citizen-expert inquiry may hold the key to solving contempo-
rary policy problems); Ernest Gellhom, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings,
81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972) (examining the trend of allowing citizen groups and individu-
als to intervene as full-scale public parties in administrative hearings). For arguments
that this interaction derogates from democracy, see KAY LEHALIN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN
T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERIcAN DEMOCRACY 386-410 (1986) (de-
scribing interest group politics as characterized by "dispersed inequalities" and con-
cluding that these inequalities are likely to persist for the foreseeable future); SIDNEY
VERBA & NORtMAN H. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND
SOCIAL EQUALITY (1972) (highlighting the negative impact of the close relationship in
America between social status and political participation); Lowi, supra note 6, at 166-68
("Delegation today represents a bastardization of earlier realities.").
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similarities with the electoral process and often serves similar pur-
poses.
The point is not that administrative interaction is good or bad;
clearly, it is both, just like elections. In some cases, interest groups
appear to dominate both processes,' 5 while in other cases, general
public values seem to control. To think clearly about these processes,
we must stop comparing them to the standard of self-government,
participation, or deliberation derived from a pre-administrative con-
cept of democracy having little relationship to contemporary govern-
ment. We also need to stop regarding these mechanisms as qualita-
tively different from elections and making categorical judgments on
the basis of this perceived difference. They are different, to be sure,
but they are both part of the interactive process by which a modem
administrative state relates to its citizens.
According to John Rohr, this overlap between elections and ad-
ministration is part of America's constitutional design.'66 As originally
conceived, the Senate was a quasi-executive body, possessing expertise
and stability, while the House of Representatives was expected to
maintain direct contact between the people and the government. '6'
The Framers, worried that House districts were too large for the Rep-
resentatives to fulfill this function, reduced them from 40,000 to
30,000 people on the last day of the Convention."s At present, of
course, House districts have grown to about half a million people,
which is one-seventh of the population of the entire United States at
the time of ratification. Their intended function, Rohr argues, fell to
administrative agencies, the one part of government numerous
enough to maintain direct contact with a population of 250 million.
The fact that agency officials are unelected may seem to distinguish
them from the original representatives, but, according to Rohr, both
1,4 St, Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Denocracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20
C-DOZO L. REv. 775 (1999) (arguing against a proposal to resurrect the nondelega-
tion doctrine vis-A-vis government agencies).
b, For an analysis of the iay that different types of groups interact with administra-
tive agencies, see Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Regulatory Stakeholders: Limits on
Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Unixersity of Pennsylvania Law Review).
Sue ROHR, supra note 4 (claiming that the modern administrative state is consis-
tent with the goals of the Framers).
Sur id. at 28-53 (comparing the rationales behind the creation of the Senate and
the House of Representatives).
1, So, 2 THE REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 643-44 (Max Far-
rand ed., 1966) (describing unanimous approval of the motion of Mr. Gorham to sub-
stitute 30,000 for 40,000 as "greater security for the rights and interests of the people").
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the federalists and anti-federalists agreed that elections are irrelevant
to the process of representation. Since the people are sovereign, gov-
emnment officers who are selected in accordance with a Constitution
ratified by the people can be counted as their representatives.'"
Rohr's account appears a bit overstated, primarily because it relies
too heavily on the origin of government as a source of legitimacy. The
initial ratification of a governmental design surely does not guarantee
that our norms will be fulfilled; the ratified design must contain
mechanisms to implement those norms on a continuous basis. Elec-
tions have proven to be a crucial mechanism for selecting the most
authoritative government officials, and it seems unlikely, although not
inconceivable, that we would be able to achieve our norms through
any other means. Rohr, however, is correct in noting that the Framers
were sophisticated enough to look through this tradition to its under-
lying purpose even though they may have been motivated largely by
tradition in their use of elections. They recognized that election is
indeed a mechanism, and might well have searched for other mecha-
nisms, in the radically different setting of the modem state, to achieve
their underlying commitments. 170 In fact, the interaction between
administrative agents and the citizenry is an essential means by which
we currently achieve those commitments-security, prosperity, and
liberty. They are not the same as elections, but they provide a substi-
tute when the electoral process reaches its natural limit. The ten-
dency to ignore this continuity and underemphasize the value of ad-
ministrative interaction is another effect of using the term
"democracy" to describe our current government.
Moreover, there is a further continuity that democratic theory
tends to ignore. Just as citizens interact with administrative agencies
169 See ROHR, supra note 4, at 45-46 (discussing the suggestion that the administra-
tive state may cure the defects of the representative system).
170 A number of observers note that these commitments cannot be described in
terms of the direct democracy concept of self-rule. See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountabil-
ity, Liberty and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998) (arguing that elected and
unelected branches of government are interdependent rather than in opposing posi-
tions of legitimacy); Envin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103
HARV. L. REV. 43 (1989) (describing the 1988-1989 Term Rehnquist Court jurispru-
dence and its effects on the majoritarian paradigm); Lawrence G. Sager, The Inconigible
Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893 (1990) (recognizing the inability to harmonize abso-
lute popular sovereignty with constitutional traditions). Given the fact that the) were
trying to solve practical problems of governance and that direct democracy wras a
Greek idea with little role in the development of Western governments, the Framers'
rejection of direct democracy is not particularly surprising. The sense of unease that it
generates dissipates after getting past the description of our Constitution as a "demo-
cratic" one.
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in a variety of distinctive ways, these agencies interact with their ad-
ministrative and elected superiors in an equivalent fashion. They
lobby their superiors, threatening, begging, and cajoling on the basis
of the emergent institutional behaviors intersubjectively generated
within their structure." When dealing with the legislature-their ul-
timate superior-agencies generally favor or oppose legislation that
affects them. In a parliamentary system, their position typically will be
negotiated within the confines of the ruling party; in a presidential
system, like the United States, agencies often testify, supply informa-
tion, and draft legislation just like nongovernmental lobbyists. Con-
versely, elected officials often engage in support-building or opposi-
tion-blunting among the relevant administrative agencies, as well as
among citizens. All of these activities need to be understood by a mi-
croanalysis of their actual operation, not by global characterizations.
B. The Function and Meaning ofAdministrative Interaction
As stated, administrative interaction differs from electoral interac-
tion in that it does not address the issues of succession, competence,
or debilitation. Elections are unnecessary at the administrative level
because an administrative hierarchy deals with these issues quite de-
finitively through the appointment process. Administrative interac-
tion, however, does address the issue of government responsiveness in
a manner that is quite analogous to electoral interaction, and exer-
cises similar influences on the social meaning of governance. To start,
it secures responsiveness through a continuous flow of information
from citizens to government that resembles lobbying in many ways.
Interestingly, this process is not tied to an electoral sanction, but
stands on its own. As Mark Seidenfeld suggests, 17 there has been an
M7 Sc, e.g., DA.'MS, supra note 162 (examining the external and internal politics of
the government's defense agencies and programs); DERTHICK & QUIRK, supra note
162, at 74-85 (weighing the influence of staffs on commission leaders in the deregula-
tion of the airline, telecommunications, and trucking industries); RONALD N. JOHNSON
& GARY 0. LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF
BuRL\UcRc': THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1994)
(discussing the evolution of the federal civil service system and the relationship of gov-
ernment employees to their elected and appointed leaders); THOMAS IL MCCRAW,
PROPHETS OF REGULATION 308 (1984) (rejecting the assumption that regulators must
have failed simply because regulation has failed to achieve its goals and fulfill its pur-
poses); MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION: THE RISE AND PAUSE OF
THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT (1982) (recalling experiences and lessons learned during
the author's career as a consumer advocate and eventual head of the Federal Trade
Commission).
17, S, Seidenfeld, supra note 7, at 1516 ("Congress should amend the Administra-
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effort to provide a legal basis for it by statute, specifically the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. 73 First, the Act requires the agency to give no-
tice of proposed rulemaking to the public, and gives any interested
person an opportunity to submit written comments to the agency be-
fore the rule goes into effect.'7 4 Second, it provides various proce-
dural protections, such as notice and a hearing, for a person subject to
an administrative adjudication. 75 Third, the agency's compliance with
the requirements is supervised by the judiciary. 76 In the case of ad-
ministrative adjudication, this supervision is fairly stringent since the
agency is expected to demonstrate that it has taken account of the
nongovernmental inputs in various ways, and since there exists a thou-
sand year-long tradition about what these expectations mean. In the
case of rulemaking, the supervision is somewhat less stringent, and
certainly more mercurial. There is no clear idea about the way the
agency is expected to respond to submitted comments-the statute
provides no guidelines and the whole mechanism is only fifty years
old, having been invented by the statute and lacking the tradition that
establishes an intersubjective comprehension of its meaning. As a re-
sult, the judiciary's doctrinal gyrations in carrying out its supervisory
function regarding regulations have become notorious.' 7
five Procedure Act to require public involvement in the early stages of agency policy
formulation.").
173 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 561-568, 570, 701-706 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (governing
administrative procedure, regulatory function, and judicial review of agencies).
174 See id. § 553 (governing notification requirements of rulemaking). For discus-
sions of this provision, see CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOvERNMENT
AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 83-85 (2d ed. 1999); Colin S. Diver, Policymak-
ing Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 424 (1981); William F. Pe-
derson, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 73-74 (1975); Peter
L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1470 (1992).
175 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-558 (dictating administrative procedures for adjudications).
For discussions, see JERRY MASHAW, BUREAUCrATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCLL
SECURITY DISABILIY CLAIMs (1983); Gellhom, supra note 163; Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Fed-
eral Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 ADMIt. L. REv. 109
(1981); Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 258 (1978).
176 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (governing judicial review of agencies). For discussions,
see CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKINGJUDICIAL CONTROL
OF BUREAUCRACY (1990); R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE C\SE
OF THE CLEAN AIR AC" (1983); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 ADMNIIN. L. REv. 363 (1986); Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Re-
view, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1985).
177 See EDLEY, supra note 176, at 96-130 (discussing the judiciary's difficulties in ap-
plying standards of review to administrative proceedings); MELNICK, supra note 176, at
53-70 (discussing judicial oversight of regulations promulgated pursuant to the Clean
Air Act); Garland, supra note 176 (exploring the various types of judicial review em-
ployed in response to administrative deregulation); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some
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These statutorily defined and judicially supervised nongovern-
mental inputs do not, however, represent the total repertoire of inter-
actions between agencies and the society. Indeed, they include only
the small fraction of that repertoire that receives disproportionate at-
tention because it fits traditional models of governmental action.
Regulations seem particularly significant because they are analogized
to statutes, both in the scholarly literature and the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act itself. Adjudications acquire a similar prominence because
they are analogous to civil trials. In fact, the relationship between any
agency and those whom it regulates goes far beyond anything that re-
sembles either legislating or adjudicating. The agency is in direct and
continuous contact with the regulated industry. It interprets existing
rules, enforces those rules, investigates potential infractions, demands
information about general industry conditions, supplies information
about legal compliance or technical requirements, provides employ-
ees to the industry and draws its own employees from that source, op-
poses the industry's legislative initiatives, or joins it in those initia-
ives. 1 During this process, it constantly receives communications
from the firms it regulates. These communications include informa-
tion, suggestions, complaints, threats to appeal to the agency's admin-
istrative or elected superiors, promises to comply, and threats and
promises to sue.179
TIhtwghts on -De os'ifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1410-26 (1992) (ex-
amining the application of various standards ofjudicial review in the "ossification" of
the informal rulemaking process); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened
S, outiv' of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons
0 Ag, nc ' Dirciions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387 (arguing that changing standards of judicial
rexiew regarding the requirement that agencies justify their own decisions is the result
of a change in the Supreme Court's doctrinal bent concerning separation of powers
issue%).
1S ur, BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 162; CHUBB, supra note 162, at 68-72 (discuss-
ing how bureaucratic changes impacted energy policy); ANN KHADEMIAN, THE SEC
,AND C \PIImu NLXRKET REGULATION 7 (1992) (examining "the longstanding battle over
the rules that define [the SEC's] jurisdiction and its decisionmaking, as well as its role
in making federal securities policy"); CIRL H MOORE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
(1990) (detailing the effects of the Federal Reserve System on the banking industry
and economy); ROGER G. NOLL ET AL., ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION
RLCULTION 97-128 (1973) (discussing the FCC's policies and the possibilities for
regulatory change).
For studies that describe this process, see BRUCE A. ACKERMA.N & WILLIvo T.
H SsLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981); ADA-NIS, supra note 162; BARDACH & KAGAN,
,upm note 162;JOHN BRAITHMAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL
MI\E S UETY (1985); DERTHICK, supra note 162; PAULJ. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE
IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981); Robert A. Kagan & John T. Scholz, The
"Crninolgy of the Corporation" and Regulator, Enforcement Strategies, in ENFORCING
RIE ULTION 67 (Keith Hawkins &John M. Thomas eds., 1984).
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Nor are these the only signals that the agency receives from non-
governmental sources. In situations where the regulated parties op-
posed the initial statute-and this is not always the case, by any
means-there will be other groups that favor its enactment; if there
were no such groups, there probably would have been no statute.
These groups, which, in a typical case, may consist of environmental-
ists, consumer advocates, social welfare advocates, and investor repre-
sentatives, also send signals to the regulating agency.' Moreover, the
general norms that support the electoral process, and are supported
by it, are that the government is an instrumentality of its citizens and
that the citizens are part of the political process. These norms often
increase the influence that public interest groups exert.'8' The result
is that a regulatory agency will receive strong signals from civil society,
as well as from the economic system represented by the regulated
firms.
Both legally regulated and relatively unregulated interactions at
the administrative level are crucial elements in the relationship be-
tween an administrative state and its citizens. These interactions serve
some of the same purposes as elections in that they make government
more responsive to citizens, and they contribute to various aspects of
its social meaning. This does not mean, once again, that they always
achieve these goals any more than elections always do."2 It simply
means that the basic structure of legally regulated and relatively un-
regulated interactions gives them that potential. When we regard
180 See CHUBB, supra note 162 (explaining the organizational politics and theoreti-
cal perspectives of the relationship between interest groups and regulators);
MCFARLAND, supra note 103, at 67-105 (describing the actions of six public interest
groups); MELNICK, supra note 176, at 35-38 (discussing the interest groups participat-
ing in clean air regulation); cf. STAGGENBORG, supra note 103 (discussing social advo-
cacy in the form of the impact of the movement to legalize abortion). But see NADEL,
supra note 103, at 169-73 (finding that consumer groups do not adequately lobby ad-
ministrative agencies).
1 For accounts of the influence of "public interest groups," defined here simply as
lobbying organizations whose members' motivations are non-economic, see ROBERT A.
KATZMANN, INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY. THE SAGA OF TRANSPORTATION POLICY FOR
THE DISABLED (1986) (discussing the influence of dignity and rights related disabled
groups such as the Paralyzed Veterans of America and the American Coalition of Citi-
zens with Disabilities); MICHELE McKEEGAN, ABORTION POLITICS (1992); Edward L.
Rubin, Introduction: Minimizing Harm as a Solution to the Crime Policy Conundrum, in
MINIMIZING HARM: A NEW CRIME POLICY FOR MODERN AMERICA 1, 29-30 (Edward L.
Rubin ed., 1999) (explaining the effects of public opinion on harm minimization
strategies and suggesting the appropriate weight legislators should accord this public
opinion); UNDERSTANDING THE NEW POLITICS OF ABORTION (Malcolm L. Goggin ed.,
1993).
12 See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
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these interactions on their own terms, rather than in the distorting
light of democratic theory, their potential advantages, as well as their
actual shortcomings, become easier to understand.
With respect to responsiveness, the negative image of bureaucracy
that is most vivid and indelible is of the petty autocrat who tramples
on the rights and sensibilities of helpless citizens-the Very Important
Person of Gogol's Overcoat,b3 the law court officers of Kafka's Tria4.'8
the EPA official in Ghostbusters,'s' the rule-bound bureaucrats of Philip
Howard's Death of Common Sense.1 This dreaded personage is deaf to
logic, blind to experience, and invulnerable to supplication; he will do
nothing other than follow orders from above, or, as Bardach and Ka-
gan state, go by the book."7 Given the abstract nature of rules and the
complexity of actual circumstances, his decisions often will be unfair
and ill regularly detract from human liberty.
The standard theory of democracy suggests that bureaucrats are
supposed to be controlled by elected officials, specifically the legisla-
tors and the chief executive. '8 Modem versions of democratic theory
add the possibility of lobbying these officials, negotiating with them,
or inducing them to perform casework on one's behalf. None of this
is very reassuring, however. For most people, electoral control is sim-
ply too intermittent and remote. Conceivably, a regime that people
would be willing to call a democracy could function as Habermas envi-
sions,1' with the administrative agencies completely insulated from
the citizens and all interactions running through elected officials. It
would subject the people to tremendous risks of oppression, however,
and deny itself essential and familiar mechanisms by which such op-
1" NICOL' V. GOGOL, The Overcoat, in TALES OF GOOD AND EVIL 272 (David Ma-
garshack trans., 1949).
J F&AINz IFKA, THE TRIAL (Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans., 1988).
GHOSTBUSTERS (Columbia/Delphi 1984).
PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING
AMERICA (1994).
S 'BARDACH & KAG.AN, supra note 162.
St-rJMES FREEDNLMN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
,XND AMNIERIc-N GOVERNME'T 58-77 (1978); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LA.w 136-40 (1997). There
is no question, at least in the United States, that all administrative agencies must be
authoirized by elected officials, usually Congress and the President, in the form of a
statute, and occasionally either body acting individually (for example, the Congres-
sional Budget Office and the Office of Management and Budget). The only subject of
controversy is whether these elected officials are exercising enough control to pass
constitutional standards. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 6; Lowi, supra note 6.
'" ce I-lABERMS, supra note 105, at 329-87.
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pression is constrained. Fortunately for us, modem Western govern-
ments do not conform to this pattern.'9 They consist of a multiplicity
of agencies that are connected to the firms or individuals they regu-
late by linkages allowing two-way interactions. Through these link-
ages, as well as other, more attenuated linkages to the agencies' supe-
riors, both elected and appointed, nongovernmental entities
communicate regularly with their public counterparts, stating various
demands that may frustrate many regulatory initiatives but also secure
fair and efficient treatment for themselves.
This interaction also contributes to the responsiveness of agency
officials by providing them with information-not only unexpected or
previously unwanted information, but also information that they need
and would seek out on their own if it were not provided to them."' It
does so, however, in a quantity that a tax-supported government could
not realistically collect with its own resources. Such information con-
tributes to responsiveness because it enables administrative officials to
avoid the unexpected consequences of their policies that neither they,
nor those subject to them, would desire: regulations aimed at one
problem can cause economic losses that are unrelated to the problem,
and that could be avoided if more complete information were ob-
tained. Of course, this same process also provides administrative deci-
sionmakers with lies, half-truths, and distorted interpretations moti-
vated by the mindsets and material self-interest of the participating
private parties. As long as there are multiple interests involved and
multiple sources of information, however, the process has a self-
corrective quality: experienced administrators readily discount exag-
gerations and generally discover outright lies, with serious conse-
quences for the credibility of their originators.
In addition, administrative interaction contributes to government
responsiveness through a more general or diffuse effect. Government
officials-in any kind of government-can become isolated from the
190 But see ROBERT KAGAN & LEE ALExRAD, REGULATING ENCOUNTERS (2000) (ex-
plaining that the United States's legal system is characterized by lower levels of coop-
eration than other industrialized nations and relies more heavily on litigation, a pat-
tern that leads to inefficiency).
191 See KERWIN, supra note 174, at 66-70 (describing the legally mandated public
participation in rulemaking); Robert G. Healy & William Ascher, Knowledge in the Polic "
Process: Incorporating New Environmental Information in Natural Resources Polic' Making, 28
POL'Y SCI. 1 (1995) (discussing the use of data from the natural and social sciences in
natural resources policymaldng); Jerry T. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process:
Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness and Timeline S in
the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 772 (1974) (outlining the
information provided by the welfare adjudicatory process).
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citizenry, even if their stated goal is to serve the people's interests.
Because they want to keep theirjobs and do them well, they can easily
become self-protective and develop a withering contempt for the im-
poverished, disorganized individuals, the resource-laden, recalcitrant
firms, and the self-centered citizenry in general whom they are ex-
pected to control. Such isolation becomes particularly problematic
when governance issues are highly technical and when administrative
bureaucracies are as large as those of modem states. Formal and in-
formal obligations to interact with their clients and regulatees gener-
ate countervailing attitudes and institutional structures. By bringing
the citizenry into the decisionmaking process and creating opportuni-
ties for face-to-face negotiation, these interactive mechanisms compel
administrators to confront the people whom they regulate. In addi-
tion, interaction often generates affective bonds between participants,
even in situations where legal rules compelled the initial contacts.
With respect to social meaning, administrative interaction is again
analogous to elections in various ways. It does not, of course, provide
administrators with the sense of status that elections provide. On the
contrary, the fact that administrative officials are appointed, not
elected, generally indicates their subordinate status. This interaction,
however, does place many administrators in the same middle ground
between expertise and politics that most elected officials inhabit, gen-
erating the same desire to integrate these various inputs and the same
ethos of practical judgment.
In recent years, an extensive scholarly discussion has focused on
an issue generally framed as the conflict between expertise and plural-
1'. Many observers claim that pluralism is increasing at the cost of
expertise, that the administrative agency's elaborate machinery that
was supposed to manufacture optimal results is being dismantled, to
be replaced with a political struggle between the opposing sides of ex-
pertise and pluralism."" But this interpretation of modem develop-
"" For works exploring the tension between expertise and pluralism, see STEPHEN
BREAER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOwARD EFFECTIE RISK REGULATION (1993);
Gerald E. Frug, The Ideolog of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1276
(1984); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Reform of the American Administrative Process: The
Coutmporarv Debate, 1984 WIS. L. REv, 385; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of Ameri-
can Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667 (1975); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups
in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985).
1. Ste Lowi, supra note 6, at 175-76 (discussing the decline of legislative policymak-
ing); Richard B. Steart, Madison's Nightmare 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 335 (1990) (lament-
ing the influence of factions on administrative agencies); Stewart, supra note 192 (dis-
cussing the traditional model and the interest representation model of agency
discretion). But see Martin Shapiro, On Predicting the Future of Administrative Law,
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ments, and the lugubrious conclusions often drawn from it, arises par-
tially from the beliefs that only electoral interactions are part of the
legitimate, democratic process and that administrative interaction un-
dermines that process. The critique of Dahl's high expectations for
polyarchic pluralism is equally relevant to administrative interaction.
Once the term "democracy" is set aside, and administrative interac-
tions are treated, like elections, as a mechanism for interaction be-
tween government and society, both the trend and its interpretation
disappear.
The idea that nongovernmental input into agency decisionmaking
is increasing results from the greater salience that contemporary
events possess for us. This input has always been high in the United
States, the only recent change being the developments in civil society
that generated more public interest groups. 94 The dichotomy be-
tween this input and expertise is equally misleading. When wide-
spread social consensus exists about the proper way to carry out some
functions, like how to build a bridge, that consensus is likely to prevail
because political opposition to it would lack meaning. Many technical
issues, however, are in fact regularly contested: the proper method of
valuing bank assets, the level of specified substances that is dangerous
to human health, the effectiveness of a particular medicine, and the
economic impact of insider trading are all matters that knowledgeable
parties debate intensely. The expert advice that an administrator re-
ceives from within the agency will not necessarily be free from politi-
cal considerations. Different people in the agency have different ide-
ologies, and the ultimate decision may be one that affects the agency's
budget or the scope of its discretion. Conversely, the exercise of po-
litical influence from outside the agency is rarely characterized by out-
right threat. Typically, interested parties will present the best case for
their position by invoking the same sorts of expertise that is available
within the govemmental apparatus. It is not an expression, nor a dis-
tortion, of the people's will, but simply part of the complex variety of
inputs that a modern decisionmaker invariably confronts. To resolve
the situation, the decisionmaker will try to integrate these inputs, rely-
ing on the same sense of practical judgment that animates elected of-
ficials.
From the citizens' perspective, administrative interaction tends to
produce a similar sense of membership in the political process as elec-
REGULATION, May/June 1982, at 18 (asserting that expertise is making a comeback).
194 For discussions of interest group domination in earlier eras, see BEARD, supra
note 160; KOLKO, supra note 160.
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tions do. To begin with, it provides additional opportunities for citi-
zens to participate in governance without, of course, an Aristotle-
inspired requirement of participation. The kind of participation that
administrative interaction involves may seem mundane compared to
images of an aroused electorate unseating corrupt legislators or pre-
senting petitions to the chief executive. It serves similar needs, how-
ever, and provides similar kinds of opportunities. A citizen who finds
fulfillment in political action to protect the environment may be un-
able to do so unless she can interact with the administrative agency
that implements governmental policy in that area.
Furthermore, interactions with an administrative agency tend to
induce citizens to cooperate with regulatory commands, in part be-
cause the), feel they have had some input into the process, and in part
because of the institutional isomorphism that the process generates."5
It is virtually impossible for any government to obtain a reasonable
level of compliance from an entirely recalcitrant populace."" Even a
government that recruits its troops from foreign lands and is ready to
use unlimited amounts of force will be hobbled quickly if the popu-
lace responds only to direct compulsion. Regulated parties are more
likely to cooperate if they have interacted with government decision-
makers at the time the program was designed. '9 7 Like elections, inter-
action in program design changes attitudes. The individuals in the
participating institution will become acclimated to the regulatory re-
gime and see themselves as operating within it, rather than opposing
it in its entirety. More concretely, interaction will generally give an in-
e SaDiMaggio & Powell, supra note 156; Meyer, supra note 156.
This is a major theme of the growing literature on regulatory implementation.
S,,, v. ., AIRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 7; BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 162;
PRESSMUN & WILDAVSKY, supra note 162; JAY A. SIGLER & JOSEPH E. MuRPHY,
INTERACTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO REGUL.XTORY
COMPULSION (1988); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Douglas C.
Michael, Coop(-ative Implementation of Federal Regulations, 13 YALEJ. ON REG. 535 (1996);
Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of Author-
it ,, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 873. Much of this work was done by social scientists who study
law or by legal scholars who are sociologically oriented. From a doctrinal point of view,
the important issue is to state the proper or desirable legal rule. Once the sociological
perspective on the legal system is in place, the question is whether this statement has
any effect. Administrative agencies, of course, are designed partly to ensure that the
legal rule does have real-world effects. The agencies can thus be regarded as the result
of political participants developing the same social science mentality as political ob-
'.ners.
P,7 Sajody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
638-64 (2000) (advocating a role for private parties in the setting, implementation, and
enforcement of regulatory standards).
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stitution the opportunity to alert the administrators to truly disastrous
consequences that were not foreseen and could have been avoided.
Once the program is in place, moreover, compliance with it is always a
matter of negotiation-always the product of an interactive process
between the agencies and the parties whom it regulates.' Although
this interactive process often appears to decrease the level of compli-
ance, it generally increases it by securing higher levels of cooperation
with less stringent requirements. Achieving compliance without co-
operation would generally require higher levels of force and greater
expenditures of resources than elected representatives would be will-
ing to tolerate in all but the most extreme situations.
C. Administrative Interaction and the Design of Government
Administrative interaction, therefore, can be considered on its
own terms and in relation to our genuine political commitments,
rather than in terms of its impact on the premodern concept of de-
mocracy. It then becomes possible to think more realistically about
ways of using administrative interaction in the design of contemporary
institutions. The question is not whether administrative interaction
should be increased, altered, or restricted to make government more
democratic. Rather, we should ask how we can vary the level of ad-
ministrative interaction to achieve agreed-upon goals such as security,
prosperity, and liberty.
To begin with, the catalogue of administrative interaction's func-
tions and meaning is not meant to imply that this mechanism is free
of disadvantages. In fact, these disadvantages are substantial. As Jim
Rossi points out, interaction can seriously disrupt the deliberative
process within an administrative agency.'" Thus, particular mecha-
nisms for interaction must be designed to mediate between their po-
tential disadvantages and the potential advantages previously dis-
cussed. In some cases, the disadvantages are so great that they warrant
M. See JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DIsCRETION: AUTONOMY,
COMMUNrTY, BUREAUCRACY 79-120 (1986) (discussing cooperative decisionmaking in
the context of special education policy); BRIAN Z. TAMLANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGXL
THEORY: PRAGMATISM AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW 129-52 (1997) (describing law as
a shared meaning system between officials and private parties); Laura Langbein &
Cornelius M. Kenvin, Implementation, Negotiation and Compliance in Environmental and
Safety Regulation, 47J. POL. 854 (1985) (examining the role of negotiation in compli-
ance with environmental and safety regulations).
1 Seejim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative
Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173 (1997) (discussing the tension between
participation and administrative deliberation).
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radical constriction of the interactive process, typically by means of
formal rules. When the status of an individual is being adjudicated,
for example, our general view is that the only fair considerations are
the pre-existing rule that establishes the status in question, and the
pre-existing facts that the rule establishes as relevant to its application.
Parties with no direct involvement in the case cannot provide informa-
tion about such matters. They might provide information about a
particular decision's impact, but that is usually deemed an irrelevant
and, indeed, unfair consideration. Consequently, the interactive link-
ages are highly formalized and constrained in the adjudicative setting.
The adjudicative example is a temptingly familiar one, but the
need for insulation from the interactive process should not be con-
flated with the role of judges or the separation-of-powers concept.
Administrators perform the bulk of adjudications in modem Western
governments," ' while judges do many things that cannot plausibly be
called adjudication, such as drafting procedural rules, managing the
judicial budget, hiring staff, and administering the courts' daily opera-
tions. Moreover, adjudication is not the only setting in which interac-
tion needs to be constrained. Western nations have concluded that
their central banks' control over the money supply should not be in-
fluenced by private parties. 1  It seems unlikely that any convincing
connection between this function and adjudication can be asserted.
Rather, the decision to restrict the interactive process must be based
on a microanalysis of the particular decision, guided by the moral
commitments that we perceive to be at stake. In the adjudicative set-
ting, interaction external to formal rules is generally regarded as un-
fair; in the monetary control setting, it is viewed as inefficient. It can
be excluded because the government's decision is generally not re-
garded as raising any liberty or fairness issues that would demand par-
ticipation. The decisionmaker has adequate internal sources of in-
formation and the government can implement its policy decisions
without private cooperation. The point is that the restriction of inter-
action, like interaction generally, is a specific mechanism of govern-
ance that should be deployed on the basis of our consciously identi-
fied commitments and a microanalysis of the decision in question.
Certainly, a categorical, tradition-based rule, such as the separation of
S,,,, N SHAW, supra note 175.
Sre Geoffrey P. Miller, An Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Independence, 27J.
LEGAL StUD. 433 (1998) (discussing how an independent central bank prevents rent-
Necking behamior by regulators that is possible when the bank is subject to the influ-
ence of interest groups).
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the judicial branch from the legislative and executive branches, can-
not explain either the actual or ideal application of this mechanism.
While administrative interaction needs to be restricted in some
situations, it needs to be encouraged and facilitated in others. The
Administrative Procedure Act recognized three important, albeit tra-
dition-bound, models of interaction: comments on proposed rules,
participation in adjudicatory decisions, and appeals to courts as super-
visors of rulemaking and adjudication."' The Freedom of Informa-
tion Act gave citizens access to internal agency records that facilitated
formal and informal interaction.0 3 With the Sunshine Act, the gov-
ernment gave citizens access to agency meetings that provided addi-
tional information, as well as opportunities for direct negotiation. ''
The latter two acts were rather bluntly drafted instruments that
granted comprehensive rights and then provided restrictions by ex-
cluding broad categories of information or meetings. As a result, the
rights they granted can be abused by private parties, and their excep-
tions can be abused by government agencies."5 They seem to have
been patterned on the rather traditional model of civil litigation, giv-
202 See Seidenfeld, supra note 7; Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administra-
tive Procedure, 78 CoLUMi. L. REV. 258 (1978) (advocating reform of administrative pro-
cedure to address long-standing criticisms).
203 Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
204 Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §
552b (1994)). This is one of the earliest American laws with a cutesy name. The refer-
ence is to the famous line by Justice Brandeis that "[sJunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER
PEOPLE'S MONEYAND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1932).
205 See Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive In-
fluence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REv. 917 (1990) (discussing the value of in-
formation, as well as the positive influence of limited information, in decisionmaking);
Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safe(y
Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837 (1980)
(analyzing the circumstances in which information gathered by federal regulatory
agencies should be made available to the public); Rossi, supra note 199, at 228-36 (dis-
cussing the Freedom of Information Act and the Sunshine Act, highlighting potential
negative effects of passive participation on agency decisionmaking); Antonin Scalia,
The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 1982, at 14 (argu-
ing that the Freedom of Information Act, which was designed to illuminate the work-
ings of government, in fact protects the privacy needs of government more than it pro-
tects those of private institutions); Thomas H. Tucker, "Sunshine"--The Dubious New
God, 32 ADMIN. L. REv. 537 (1980) (discussing the "Government in the Sunshine Act"
and the openness movement); Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short
Case Study in the Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649
(1984) (explaining the history and current role of the Freedom of Information Act
and noting its shortcomings).
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ing private citizens rights that are akin to discovery and agencies a
counterbalancing privilege to resist discovery. Clearly, these two acts
need to be fine-tuned, but they also need to be joined by other provi-
sions that are not bound to traditional models.
Congress has made several efforts to facilitate administrative in-
teraction in ways that go beyond traditional patterns. The Magnuson-
Moss Act attempted to provide funding for consumer groups to par-
ticipate in Federal Trade Commission rulemaking.0 ' The Consumer
Product Safety Act allowed citizens to petition the Consumer Product
Safety Commission to initiate a rulemaking proceeding and to partici-
pate in Commission-initiated rulemaking by producing their own
proposals. Criticism of these innovations is often based on exagger-
ated expectations of them. They will not ensure fairness, secure self-
government, or conform to our inherited concept of democracy. All
that these innovations can reasonably achieve is to increase the quan-
tity and quality of interaction at the administrative level. It seems un-
likely that inherited models of interaction, based on prior experience
ith legislation and adjudication, really exhaust the possibilities for
developing interactive mechanisms in this relatively new arena.
Consider three exemplary government activities: environmental
protection, public welfare, and foreign intelligence. For all three, a
more active and regularized interaction process would advance the
goals of security, prosperity, and liberty. In the environmental area,
proponents of development possess an impressive capacity to present
their claims to both electoral and administrative officials, and since
development is an inherently specific process in most cases, firms with
Federal Trade Commission Warranty Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, Tide II, 88 Stat.
2193 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57 (1994 & Supp. W 1998)); see also
Barry B. Boyer, Funding Public Participation in Agency Proceedings: The Federal Trade Com-
mission Expcrience, 70 GEO. L.J. 51 (1981) (examining the Federal Trade Commission's
compensation provision, its implementation, and its effects on rulemaking proceed-
ings). For a critique of agencies' paying representational costs, see Shapiro, supra note
193, at 22.
Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 10, 86 Stat. 1217 (1972),
ropeahd by Consumer Product Safety Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1210,
95 Stat. 703, 721; see also Antonin Scalia & Frank Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Con-
sumer Product Safe(v Act, 20 UCLA L. REV. 899 (1973) (examining some of the novel
problems of administrative procedure posed by the Consumer Product Safety Act).
For critiques of the design to increase public participation, see JERRY L. MASHAW, DuE
PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 262 (1985); Rossi, supra note 199, at 180-82;
Teresa M. Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Con-
sumerDicad, 51 GEO. WISH. L. REv. 32 (1982). While the problems with giving private
parties so much control over the regulatory process are obvious, failure of one experi-
ment can hardly be an indication that no further experiments should be attempted.
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a particular concern about any given issue can readily identify them-
selves. Public choice analysis predicts that those who favor environ-
mental protection cannot coalesce. In fact, however, they have done
so quite effectively. The problem in this area is to develop mecha-
nisms by which these two well organized alliances can negotiate with
the agency and each other to produce acceptable compromises and
perhaps even optimal solutions. This is a process Jody Freeman de-
scribes as "collaborative governance."0 9 A notable step in this direc-
tion is the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, which establishes procedures
under which interest groups can participate in designing agency regu-
lations. Its success has been quite mixed," ' however, and it clearly
represents only the first small, clumsily built encampment upon rela-
tively unexplored legal territory. A variety of more refined mecha-
nisms need to be developed to integrate the essentially adversarial
confrontation between developers and environmental groups with an
instrumentally rational planning process designed to achieve optimal
results. 1 We cannot evaluate such mechanisms by relying on an ab-
208 Freeman, supra note 7, at 8; see also THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 19-23
(discussing the development of a new, collaborative environmental management sys-
tem for the United States); Reich, supra note 7 (discussing how public deliberation in
the administrative decisionmaking process helps elicit and define social values).
209 Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codi-
fied as amended at5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
210 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of N\ygo-
tiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997) (presenting an empirical assessment of the
impact of negotiated rulemaking on its principal goals); William Funk, Bargaining T-
ward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46
DUKE L.J. 1351 (1997) (surveying the judicial reaction to negotiated rulemaking); Wil-
liam Funk, Wen Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest-
EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55 (1987) (suggesting that the nature of regula-
tory negotiation subverts the search for the public interest); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE LJ. 1206
(1994) (contrasting the regulatory negotiation recommendations with the incentihe-
based proposals of the National Performance Review Report). Many of these negathe
assessments are based on an implicit standard derived from our concept of democ-
racy---that the people should govern or that there is some mechanism, like an assem-
bly of all citizens, that can communicate their actual preferences to government offi-
cials. The real question is how negotiated rulemaking compares to other means of
drafting regulations. See KERWIN, supra note 174, at 190 (documenting the frequency
of reported concerns of interest groups participating in a rulemaking); Philip J. Har-
ter, Points on a Continuum: Dispute Resolution Procedures and the Administrative Proceso%, I
ADMIN. LJ. 141 (1987) (focusing on using non-Administrative Procedure Act proce-
dures to resolve disputes in decisionmaking).
One possibility is "Project XL," which involves comprehensive planning of a
plant's entire industrial process from an environmental perspective. See Freeman, su-
pra note 7 (relying on empirical evidence related to Project XL to argue that
multistakeholder processes are promising); Dennis D. Hirsch, Bill and Al's XL-ent Ad-
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stract, ill-defined criterion such as democracy.
Public welfare programs are perennially regarded as abject fail-
ures, subjecting the developers of each program to excoriation for
their naivete or ineptitude at the time of its inevitable replacement.
But we are asking too much of the experts. In the United States, a
familiar, if unstable, mixture of expertise and public input generates
public policy, and the real task is to improve this complex process.
Admittedly, encouraging the poor to participate in program planning
and implementation was a feature of President Johnson's War on Pov-
erty, and its disastrous results have been documented by Daniel Moy-
nihan.2 -' Johnson's plan, however, was far too grandiose; with its in-
apposite implications of a social welfare crusade, it aspired to create a
sense of community among the poor, mobilize them politically, and
grant them direct control over government programs that affected
them. In other words, Johnson's plan tried to provide the poor with
the advantages of democracy as we conceive it. The debacle of this
one attempt, however, reveals more about our misconceptions than
about the viability of its underlying inspiration. Clearly, interaction
between welfare recipients and government depends on organized
groups; only the wealthiest individuals can sustain such interactions.
vwntur,: An Analysis of the EPA's Legal Authority to Implement the Clinton Administration's
Projrt XL, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 129 (examining the legal foundations of Project XL);
Seidenfeld, vpra note 165, at 63-85 (describing the benefits and dangers of Project
XL).
Se EVELYN Z. BRODKIN, THE FALSE PROMISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM:
IMPLEMENTING QUALITY CONTROL IN WELFARE (1986) (tracing the emergence, im-
plementation, and consequences of administrative welfare reform, as well as the result-
ing political conflict); NAOMI GOTTLIEB, THE WELFARE BIND (1974) (calling for hu-
manization of the welfare system); JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE
REFORM (1995) (highlighting fallacies in contemporary proposals for welfare reform
and making suggestions for more effective national reform efforts); SARA. LEvrTAN ET
AL., WORK AND WELFARE Go TOGETHER (1972) (surveying factors that contributed to
the growth of welfare in the United States and examining the components of the wel-
fare system); D,"WID MACAROV, WORK AND WELFARE: THE UNHOLY ALLIANCE (1980)
(discussing problems with linking welfare to work); LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND
ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1986) (tracing the poor
record of Great Society programs); DOROTHY C. MILLER, WOMEN AND SOCIAL
WELFARE: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS (1990) (using feminist theory to define the function of
gender in the welfare system); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984) (interpret-
ing social science data analyzing poverty and race as a precursor to discussing the prob-
lems of past social policy and offering possible solutions); FRANCES FOX PIVEN &
RIcHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE
(2d ed. 1993) (deconstructing calls for welfare reform, including restrictions on aid
and measures to force female welfare recipients to work).
'11 Src DANIEL P. MOYNiHAN, MAiXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING:
COMMUNITY ACTION IN THE WAR ON POVERTY (2d prtg. 1969).
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While such groups exist, they are underdeveloped and would require
positive encouragement and funding from government.11 Precisely
why civil society can generate environmental groups with such fecun-
dity, but not welfare rights groups, is far from obvious in advance, but
it is clearly true in actuality.21 5 Since it is difficult for a government
agency to encourage the development of groups that will frequently
oppose it, another agency would probably need to be involved. In
place of the War on Poverty's grand aspirations, we need a realistic
mechanism for sending different sets of signals to social welfare agen-
cies that could be combined with the signals coming from the legisla-
ture or the agency itself to produce more fair, effective programs.
The third example of a governmental activity that would benefit
from increased interaction is military intelligence. Strictly speaking,
this is an activity without clients, other than the citizens in general.
The rationale for its insulation from the citizenry, however, lies not in
this lack of clients but in the need for secrecy that its staff members
proclaim, and that elected officials join with varying degrees of enthu-
siasm. Of course, certain intelligence functions must be kept secret-
we cannot reveal the identities of our spies. But there is nothing par-
ticularly unique about this. Prosecutors must keep their targeting
strategy secret and tax agencies must not disclose incomes reported to
them. The need to keep specific information secret does not justify
the insulation of an entire agency from public interaction."6 Rather,
that insulation has been based on our democracy-derived belief that
citizen participation is a mode of self-governance. Since an espionage
agency demands both expertise and secrecy, such participation seems
inappropriate. In fact, participation serves the more mundane, but
214 See Boyer, supra note 206 (examining the Federal Trade Commission's compen-
sation provision and the types of groups that have received funding).
215, See FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS:
WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL (1979) (discussing the inability of the poor to
generate sustained representation of their interests).
216 See LOCH K. JOHNSON, AMERICA's SECRET POWER: THE CIA IN A DEMOCRATIC
SOCIEIY (1989) (examining how the Central Intelligence Agency, with its preference
for secrecy, might best exist in the United States's open society); KATHRN S. OLMSTED,
CHALLENGING THE SECRET GOvERNMENT: THE POST-AATERGATE IN,-STIGATIONS OF
THE CIA AND FBI (1996) (examining the reasons why, after beginning their investiga-
tions, most members of Congress and the press back away from challenging the secret
government); HARRY HOWE RANSOM, THE INTELLIGENCE ESTABLISHMENT (1970) (pro-
viding an inside look at America's central intelligence system and describing the se-
crecy curtain of that system); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON COVERT
ACTION & AM. DEMOCRACY, THE NEED TO KNOW (1992) (examining covert action and
the standards of acceptable openness in American public life in recent years under a
new foreign affairs paradigm).
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thereby more generally applicable purpose of increasing security,
prosperity, and liberty. Some separate agency needs to encourage the
development of private institutions committed to monitoring and as-
sessing intelligence activities. Those institutions then need to be given
specific linkages to the agency's decisionmaking processes. This is not
an encumbrance that our system imposes on us as a price for other
liberties; it is our basic means of governing effectively, and to exclude
it in this situation represents both a loss of faith and a failure of nerve.
Of course, other governmental units are expected to supervise the
intelligence apparatus. In the United States, Congress is the authoriz-
ing agency and structural superior of the Central Intelligence Agency
("CLA,"), and the courts have some specific areas of jurisdiction. The
example, however, demonstrates the danger of relying solely on these
traditional mechanisms. Because the electoral process is heavily af-
fected by certain types of public anxieties, members of Congress have
been too easily intimidated by CIA staff members who naturally prefer
to avoid supervision. The courts have been equally timid. In United
117States v. Richardson, for example, the Supreme Court refused to re-
quire the CIA to disclose its budget on the basis of a poorly argued
procedural technicality, even though the Constitution explicitly re-
quires such disclosure. This is not to suggest that direct citizen inter-
action would necessarily have been more clear-headed or courageous
during the difficult Cold War years, but it would certainly have given
us one more opportunity to supervise an agency that had, in fact, spun
out of control.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, of course, the term "democracy" is too famil-
iar, and too emotionally resonant, to be abandoned. Besides, we have
no other word for the form of government found in modern Western
nations, and it would hardly be practical to call them systems of elec-
toral and administrative interaction. But democracy should be set
aside as an operative term for political analysis. The premodern im-
ages that it incorporates create unrealistic expectations and blind us
to contemporary circumstances. Instead, we should rely on micro-
k17 418 U.S. 166 (1974). Richardson is generally treated as a taxpayer's standing
suit. Thus, the plaintiff's claim is subject to the objection that it shifts responsibility for
a particular decision from the legislature or executive to the judiciary, violating the
constitutional scheme. Whatever one thinks of this rationale, it does not apply to
Richardson, because the Constitution's Reporting Clause, U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 7,
explicitly grants citizens a right to the requested relief.
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analysis of the actual interactions between the government and its citi-
zens. Nothing is lost by imposing such a discipline on legal and politi-
cal science scholarship. The meaning that people both inside and
outside the government attach to their actions cannot be captured by
such imagery alone, but it can be captured more effectively once we
stop viewing their actions through the distorting lens of premodern
conceptions. There is, moreover, a great deal to be gained by getting
past resonant, but outmoded, terms that we have inherited from a dif-
ferent society, and focusing on describing and improving the govern-
ment we actually possess.
